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POLITICAL BARGAINING AND JUDICIAL 
INTERVENTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
ANTITRUST FEDERALISM 
JIM ROSSI* 
ABSTRACT 
Federal judicial deference to state and local regulation is at the center 
of contentious debates regarding the implementation of competition 
policy. This Article invokes a political process bargaining framework to 
develop a principled approach for addressing the appropriate level of 
judicial intervention under the dormant commerce clause and state-action 
immunity from antitrust enforcement. Using illustrations from network 
industries, it is argued that, at core, these two independent doctrines share 
a common concern with political (not only market) failure by focusing on 
the incentives faced by powerful stakeholders in state and local 
lawmaking. More important, they share the common purpose of deterring 
the adoption of regulations with adverse spillover effects for those who do 
not participate in the relevant lawmaking process. The Article illustrates 
how a political process bargaining approach to these doctrines differs in its 
recommendations from traditional formulations, with implications for the 
degree of deference courts afford state and local laws.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Defining the scope of state and local regulation is one of the most 
difficult questions public law confronts in the context of competition 
policy. Its implications take on particular significance as we partially 
“deregulate” (or, perhaps more politically correctly, “restructure”) 
industries such as electric power and telecommunications.1 Given a strong 
tradition of state and local economic regulation, reinforced by partial 
federal jurisdiction over many regulatory problems, bargaining over the 
content of regulation is frequently left to the spheres of state and local 
politics.2  
 1. Along these lines, the use of “deregulation” in this Article is not intended to imply complete 
dismantling of regulation, but discarding certain features of traditional regulation, such as cost-of-
service ratemaking. Frequently, partial regulation of industries such as electric power and 
telecommunications remain long after these industries are deregulated. Deregulation generally entails 
disentangling network characteristics of these industries from their competitive sectors, and regulation 
of networks by federal, state and local governments remains active, even in the most “deregulated” 
environments. As Alfred Kahn has stated, “[t]he decision to regulate never represents a clean break 
with competition.” 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 113 (1988). So too, the 
decision to embrace competition in these industries never represents a clean break with regulation. See 
PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC 
UTILITY DEREGULATION 211–12 (1983) (concluding: “[o]ur analysis leads us to conclude that any 
sensible deregulation scheme will require continuing economic regulation of some segments of the 
electric power system.”); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 272 (2000) (discussing the regulatory issues for deregulated 
telecommunications markets). 
 2. Regulation operates along both horizontal dimensions, in which different territories at the 
same hierarchical level assert jurisdiction vis-à-vis each other, and vertical dimensions, in which 
different hierarchical levels of government—federal, state, and local—lay claim to regulatory power. 
The classic formulation is to see federal–state jurisdictional issues through the lens of vertical power or 
bargaining conflicts. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 52–53 (2003); Jim Chen, The Vertical Dimension of 
Cooperative Competition Policy, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 1005 (2003). For a broader discussion of the 
implications of such conceptualization for the enforcement of constitutional rights in public law, see 
Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387 (2003). 
Gardbaum rejects the “vertical” conceptualization of constitutional rights enforcement under the state 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/3
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The continued relevance of state and local politics leaves regulatory 
law in a schizophrenic balance. Given the tradition of active state 
regulation of natural monopoly in industries such as electric power and 
telecommunications (in the form of “public utility” regulation, which 
frequently involved the setting of rates),3 firms in newly restructured 
markets are regularly placed in situations in which there is a jurisdictional 
gap (i.e., no regulation of private conduct) or in which there is concurrent 
jurisdiction between federal and state agencies (i.e., two or more potential 
regulators).4 Several leading scholars argue that state and local regulation 
is fundamentally inconsistent with competitive interstate markets, and that 
perhaps courts should err on the side of expansive interpretation of federal 
regulatory authority to strengthen competition policies.5  
This Article departs from such recommendations by looking inward at 
states, rather than outward to—and upward at—federal law.6 As this 
Article discusses, jurisdictional gaps and overlaps present private firms 
with many opportunities for strategic manipulation in bargaining for 
action doctrine to conclude that “[p]rivate choices are always indirectly subject to the Constitution 
whenever an individual relies on the law to protect or enforce them, because the Constitution applies 
directly to that law.” Id. at 458–59. 
 3. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1363–64 (1998); see also Jim Chen, The Nature of the 
Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1617, 1679 (2004) 
(reviewing JOSE A. GOMEZ–IBANEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND 
DISCRETION (2003) (describing the history of rate regulation)). 
 4. See Buzbee, supra note 2 (focusing on the jurisdictional problem of federal–state overlaps, 
which he refers to as the “regulatory commons”). 
 5. See Richard D. Cudahy, Full Circle in the Formerly Regulated Industries?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 767 (2002). Judge Richard Cudahy sees federal regulation of electric power transmission as “more 
or less inherent in the scheme of deregulation and competition, which depends for its functioning upon 
widespread access to the transmission network.” Id. at 778. Richard Pierce embraces expanded 
congressional authorization for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to resolve 
transmission-siting disputes, noting the inevitable incentives states face to erect impediments to 
interstate commerce. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy & Market Entry, 15 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y FORUM (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Pierce, Environmental Regulation]. 
For more than a decade, Pierce has been arguing for the same basic congressional solution. See 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and 
Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323 (1994) [hereinafter Pierce, Competitive Markets]. Jim Chen advocates 
increased federal authority over telecommunications for similar reasons. Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural 
Telephony and the Public Interest: A Case Study in Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls, 2 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 307 (2003). 
 6. Hence, its analysis joins issue with those who wish to unpack the black box of state and local 
government. As the recent turn to focus on state and local governance chronicles, states are complex 
and nuanced regulatory systems whose governance features should not be ignored. See, e.g., Richard 
Briffault, Our Localism: Part I–The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1990); Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify 
Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959 (1991). 
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regulation at the state and local levels.7 Rather than looking to federal 
preemption as a solution, I argue that legal doctrines focused on state and 
local lawmaking can improve competition policy in emerging markets. 
However, the response of public law to the opportunities faced by private 
firms in state and local lawmaking must be something more than the 
predominant judicial stance of deference to decentralized politics.  
As James Madison recognized long ago in Federalist No. 10, the state 
political process is prone to abuses, particularly given the lower costs 
firms face in manipulating state and local, as opposed to federal, politics.8 
If, for example, a state government has the authority to refuse imports 
from other jurisdictions, that state also has the power to influence an 
industry far beyond the state’s own jurisdictional borders, shaping firm-
specific structure, contracting, and other governance issues. Public law 
doctrines delineating the appropriate balance of powers between the state 
and federal spheres of regulation have significant implications for industry 
in the U.S., as well as for the law regarding competition policy.  
These concerns are most significant in the doctrinal contexts of the 
dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution and state-action 
immunity from antitrust enforcement.9 Part I of this Article presents a 
bargaining account of the dormant commerce clause, in which its primary 
purpose is understood as protecting against the imposition of spillover 
costs on those not afforded the opportunity to participate in state and local 
political processes. On the conventional understanding, barrier-free 
markets between the states form the core of dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence.10 However, in contrast to this external market approach, 
Part I suggests that the dormant commerce clause is concerned with 
political, not only market, failure. The dormant commerce clause responds 
to a type of incompleteness in political bargaining—due to transaction 
costs, states may find it difficult to bargain with each other to ensure that 
 7. The account of regulation as bargaining is laid out more fully in JIM ROSSI, REGULATORY 
BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW (Cambridge University Press 2005). The effort focuses on developing 
a robust understanding of how bargaining and regulation interrelate, in a way that acknowledges 
incentives in the lawmaking process and the role of institutions. This account contrasts with the 
accounts presented by traditional progressives, who embrace the public interest as the animating goal 
of state regulation, and public-choice theorists, who are cynical about regulation generally, but 
especially suspicious of state and local regulation. 
 8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 9. “State-action immunity,” a judicially created antitrust defense, differs in purposes and origins 
from the “state action doctrine,” which controls the extent to which constitutional–rights protections 
may be invoked against states or private actors. See Gardbaum, supra note 2. 
 10. See infra Part I.A (presenting the traditional neoclassical account of the dormant commerce 
clause, which protects the external competitive marketplace, and contrasting it with a political process 
understanding, which is more focused on cooperative bargaining).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/3
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trade barriers are not harmful to overall social welfare. An individual 
state’s approach to monopoly regulation risks imposing spillover costs on 
other jurisdictions; by striking state legislation that is likely to impose such 
costs, the dormant commerce clause internalizes these spillover effects in 
order to improve the state political process. Part I illustrates the 
significance of this conception of the dormant commerce clause for 
competition policy in newly reconstituted industries, such as electric 
power and telecommunications.  
Part II of the Article addresses state-action immunity—a common 
defense to antitrust enforcement where a state or local government actively 
regulates a firm. For example, price-regulated public utilities, including 
electric-power and telecommunications monopolies, have long escaped 
judicial antitrust scrutiny of their regulated activities. For most of the 
twentieth century, rate hearings before state and local regulatory 
commissions alone served to police the exercise of market power. Here, a 
tension with the dormant commerce clause seems apparent: While in spirit 
the dormant commerce clause is pro-competitive (and hence anti-
protectionist), state-action immunity from antitrust enforcement is pro-
regulation, a potential contrast in goal and approach.11  
But, as Herbert Hovenkamp has observed, “Regulation by state and 
local government is not only pervasive, but it is also probably more 
susceptible to political influences than federal regulation is.”12 Part II of 
this Article advises that courts approach judicial gatekeeping in the 
antitrust context with extreme caution in emerging competitive markets. 
Once widely taken for granted by firms in the electric-power and 
telecommunications industries, state-action immunity should no longer 
automatically bar antitrust suits in utility industries. With deregulation, 
there is widespread recognition that antitrust laws may play an 
increasingly important role in deregulated industries, such as 
telecommunications, electric power, and natural gas.13 However, as Part II 
illustrates, courts embrace overbroad deference and have failed to take a 
principled approach to deciding when to intervene rather than grant state-
action immunity in antitrust claims against utility industries. According to 
 11. Put another way, one doctrine is oriented towards free trade, while another favors—and may 
even encourage—state-sanctioned monopoly. 
 12. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
335, 346. 
 13. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 748 (2004) (arguing that 
“as economic regulation has evolved it no longer makes sense to treat antitrust and regulation as 
separate bodies of doctrine—unified, they should form the building blocks of a new competition 
law.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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a recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Office of Policy Planning task 
force report on the topic, “the state action doctrine has come to pose a 
serious impediment to achieving national competition policy goals.”14  
Part III of this Article argues that a principled approach to state-action 
immunity would not embrace strong deference to decentralized lawmaking 
but would interpret this defense to antitrust enforcement in a manner 
similar to the political process bargaining account of the dormant 
commerce clause. However, the doctrinal convergence between the 
Constitution and antitrust federalism is not limited to pro-competitive 
policies that promote commercial exchange. A political process bargaining 
approach to these two doctrines illustrates their unified purpose of limiting 
the negative impact of interest-group capture of the state regulatory 
process, without completely prohibiting rent-seeking behavior. At their 
core, as Part III suggests, the fundamental goal of both doctrines is to 
protect a political process that facilitates regulatory bargaining by 
tempering self-interested interference that imposes spillover costs on non-
participants in the relevant bargaining process. This has important 
implications for courts’ approaches to considering state-action immunity 
and, specifically, for the judicial inquiry into the nature of regulatory 
supervision at the state and local level. 
As both constitutional and antitrust-federalism doctrines illustrate, in 
the context of economic regulation the judicial role requires something 
more than deference to decentralized politics. Public law, and in particular 
judicial review, should police private strategic manipulation of the 
political process in ways that are likely to impose spillover costs on non-
participants in considering dormant commerce clause challenges to state 
and local lawmakers. For the same reason, courts must play an important 
gatekeeping role in policing antitrust enforcement by allowing the state-
action-immunity defense only where adequate safeguards against welfare-
reducing private conduct are in place. 
I. A BARGAINING PROCESS ACCOUNT OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE 
CLAUSE  
At its most general level, the dormant commerce clause limits the 
power of a state or local government to impair free trade.15 Derived from 
 14. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK 
FORCE 25 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC 
STATE ACTION REPORT].  
 15. The evolution of the dormant commerce clause as a constitutional doctrine can be traced to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/3
p521 Rossi book pages.doc11/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] POLITICAL BARGAINING 527 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,16 the dormant commerce clause 
precludes a state from enacting barriers to interstate commerce that are 
blatantly discriminatory against out-of-state businesses, or which have the 
effect of bringing about such discrimination.17 As Oliver Wendell Holmes 
once remarked: 
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our 
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union 
would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the 
laws of the several States. For one in my place sees how often a 
local policy prevails with those who are not trained to national 
views and how often action is taken that embodies what the 
Commerce Clause was meant to end.18  
Although it is not an express mandate of the text of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause (hence its common reference as the 
“negative” commerce clause),19 the jurisprudence of the dormant 
commerce clause has long recognized this overall purpose. As Justice 
Cardozo famously remarked in striking down a New York law that set 
minimum prices all milk dealers were required to pay New York milk 
producers, the Commerce Clause prohibits a state law that burdens 
interstate commerce “when the avowed purpose of the [law], as well as its 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat.). Examples of the doctrine being used to strike down offending 
state and local programs abound. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); 
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 
359 U.S. 520 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona 
ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Di Santo v. 
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925). 
 16. The Commerce Clause provides that “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.  
 17. The “dormant” commerce clause embodies the notion that the grant of authority to Congress 
to regulate interstate commerce carries with it implied restrictions on the ability of states to initiate 
regulations affecting interstate commerce. 
 18. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295–96 (1920). 
 19. Among skeptical textualists, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas, the doctrine is commonly 
referred to as the “negative” commerce clause, indicating the lack of express textual basis for it in the 
Constitution. See Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1765–66 (2004). Skeptics believe that the purposes of the 
dormant commerce clause can readily be served by other, more textually explicit, constitutional 
doctrines, such as the Import-Export Clause of Article I, Section 10 or the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2. These alternatives are not without their own critics. See, e.g., Brannon 
P. Denning, Justice Thomas, The Import-Export Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 
70 U. COL. L. REV. 155 (1999); Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384 (2003). 
However, for purposes of this Article, let it suffice it to emphasize that the alternatives would make 
protections against interstate regulatory barriers much narrower.  
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necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of 
competition between the states.”20 This general principle was also invoked 
to strike a New York regulatory scheme that had been used to deny a 
license to an out-of-state milk-processing facility.21 Since the licensing 
provision had been enacted “solely [for] protection of local economic 
interests, such as supply for local consumption and limitation of 
competition,” it was found to be unconstitutional.22 
A. Bargaining, Spillover Costs, and Interstate Commerce 
City of Philadephia v. New Jersey,23 a well-known case addressing how 
the dormant commerce clause limits state regulation of waste disposal, 
illustrates the modern doctrine courts apply to further the purpose of 
protecting the external market. New Jersey prohibited the importation of 
most “solid or liquid waste” originating out of state.24 The statute was first 
challenged in state court, but the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the 
law against a dormant commerce clause challenge, concluding that it 
“advanced vital health and environmental objectives.”25 New Jersey, 
however, had failed to present any evidence that out-of-state garbage was 
more noxious than in-state garbage.26 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Stewart asserted that “where simple economic protectionism is effected by 
state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”27 As 
the Court noted in City of Philadelphia, even if the New Jersey statute was 
not per se invalid, it would not necessarily withstand constitutional 
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.28 Instead, the Court would evaluate 
it under an alternative line of analysis: “Where the statute regulates 
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects 
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”29 The Supreme Court struck down the New Jersey 
statute as a violation of the dormant commerce clause, but did not clearly 
 20. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 21. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531–32 (1949). 
 22. Id. at 531. 
 23. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
 24. Id. at 618. 
 25. Id. at 620. 
 26. Id. at 629. 
 27. Id. at 624. 
 28. Id. 
 29. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/3
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state which of these two rules—per se invalidity or balancing—it 
applied.30 
While City of Philadelphia and earlier cases suggest a fairly aggressive 
level of judicial intervention in evaluating state and local laws under the 
Constitution,31 many of the most protectionist laws have avoided dormant 
commerce clause scrutiny altogether. In comparison to non-regulated 
industries, in which norms of competition prevail, dormant commerce 
clause jurisprudence played little historical role in defining the overall 
shape of heavily regulated industries, such as electric power and 
telecommunications.32 For instance, throughout the twentieth century, the 
electric power industry was dominated by cost-of-service regulated 
utilities.33 Frequently, the sales jurisdiction of these firms was limited to 
specific state and local service territories.34 Both retail and wholesale 
transactions were price regulated, based on the cost of service.35 With such 
a regulatory framework in place, any notion of competition between 
suppliers is largely meaningless. Since a cost-of-service regulated industry 
is not in an open market in which competition can thrive, protecting 
interstate competition is of little concern. To the extent that there is any 
competition at all, it is largely limited to the political process of 
determining the applicability and scope of monopoly franchises.36 Not 
surprisingly, dormant commerce clause challenges to public utility laws in 
the twentieth century were infrequent—nearly nonexistent.37 When 
challenges were brought, federal courts typically deferred to state and 
local regulation.38  
 30. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627–29 (1978). 
 31. In fact, recently the U.S. Supreme Court has followed the lead of lower courts, which 
embrace the dormant commerce clause to suggest that state laws banning direct shipment of wine from 
out-of-state distributors, but allowing in-state distributors to ship wine, present serious dormant 
commerce clause problems. See Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005); see also Beskind v. 
Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002); Cooper v. 
McBeath, 11 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 1994); Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002); 
Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 2002).  
 32. To the extent there was no interstate trade in electric power subject to state jurisdiction, the 
opportunity for state regulators to interfere with interstate commerce was non-existent. 
 33. RICHARD F. HIRSCH, THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE 
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 40–46 (1999). 
 34. Id. See also ROSSI, supra note 7, at 177. 
 35. See, e.g., JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, 
CONTRACTS AND DISCRETION (2003). See also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3. 
 36. See Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development of Electric Power Regulation, in 
THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER 
INDUSTRY, 43, 52–61 (Peter Z. Grossman & David M. Cole eds., 2003). 
 37. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 38. A classic precedent, which formed the basis for much of twentieth century state regulation of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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However, as formerly regulated markets are deregulated, the 
introduction of competition changes the status quo, introducing a new 
vigor to dormant commerce clause challenges to public utility laws. For 
instance, since the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
deregulated wholesale electric power markets in the 1990s,39 interstate 
competition between firms in the power supply market has emerged.40 
Many states have further deregulated the retail side of electric power 
(California most famously, but other states such as Texas as well), but 
most states continue to depend on heavy state and local regulation of the 
industry.41 Against this backdrop, certain regulatory actions by a state or 
local government are constitutionally doubtful. For instance, if an 
individual state adopts a moratorium on the siting of new power plants or 
interstate transmission lines that are intended to provide service in 
wholesale (interstate) electric supply markets (as, in fact, several states 
have), this raises serious concerns under the dormant commerce clause.42 
In addition, as other authors have noted, state-imposed subsidies and 
rebates designed to encourage renewable power or environmental 
conservation may also pose a problem under the dormant commerce clause 
in a deregulated environment.43 For example, a tax that is imposed on all 
public utilities, is Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), which upheld legislative approval of joint price 
agreement by grain elevators in Chicago against a dormant commerce clause challenge, given concern 
with regulating a common carrier as a monopoly in the “public interest.” See also Saul Levmore, 
Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 610 (1983) (“In examining local 
regulations, courts should be more suspicious of those imposing substantial costs out-of-state than 
those placing costs primarily within the legislating jurisdiction.”).  
 39. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 
61 FED. REG. 21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 CFR pts. 35, 385) [hereinafter Promoting 
Wholesale Competition]. 
 40. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, THE CHANGING 
STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE, ch. 7 (Oct. 2000), available at 
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/elecricity/chg_stru_update/toc.html [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
UPDATE]. 
 41. Id. ch. 8. 
 42. Of course, many state and local governments have adopted moratoria on economic 
development and growth generally, and these may raise some legitimate concerns under the dormant 
commerce clause, but power plant and transmission line siting moratoria pose a more specific 
problem. Concerned with their states becoming transmission superhighways or power plant siting 
grounds for others, many states have considered or adopted such moratoria. See, e.g., Conn. Governor 
Signs Moratorium on Grid Projects, Keeping Cross Sound in Limbo, POWER MARKETS WK., June 30, 
2003, at 31  [hereinafter Moratorium on Grid Projects] (describing Connecticut’s moratorium on new 
transmission lines); Florida County Imposes Power Plant Moratorium, ELECTRICITY DAILY, July 2, 
2001, at 1 (describing a Broward County, Florida, moratorium that stalled a 511 megawatt merchant 
power plant that had been approved by city officials in Deerfield Beach, Florida). 
 43. See Kristen H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based 
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999); 
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power sales in a state but redistributed to favor only in-state suppliers may 
present constitutional problems. Given these changes to regulation, courts 
need to reassess the scope of deference afforded to state and local 
regulation of network industries under the dormant commerce clause.  
Since the 1980s, when deregulation took hold in a variety of industries, 
the Supreme Court has had several occasions to address the appropriate 
level of judicial deference under the dormant commerce clause. One of its 
cases on the topic, General Motors Corp. v. Tracy,44 evaluated Ohio’s 
differential tax burdens for in-state and out-of-state gas suppliers. Ohio 
had levied a five percent tax on all natural gas transactions except those 
involving local distribution companies (LDCs), which serve as an 
intermediary between end users and natural gas suppliers.45 Under Ohio’s 
natural gas tax, only in-state utilities qualified as tax-exempt LDCs, so 
Ohio’s tax scheme effectively subjected in-state and out-of-state natural 
gas suppliers to different tax burdens.46 The Court acknowledged that such 
a discriminatory scheme could violate the dormant commerce clause, but 
refused to find a violation of the dormant commerce clause on the 
particular facts that had been raised.47 General Motors, which mounted a 
legal challenge to Ohio’s differential tax, was a large enough customer to 
purchase its gas on the open market rather than bundled from a regulated 
LDC.48 Absent competition between the LDC and the open market serving 
General Motors, the Court reasoned, “there can be no local preference, 
whether by express discrimination against interstate commerce or undue 
burden upon it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may apply.”49  
Other cases extend the reach of the dormant commerce clause beyond 
merely protecting external (interstate) markets. In C&A Carbone, Inc. v. 
Town of Clarkstown,50 the Supreme Court invalidated a municipally-
imposed monopoly over non-recyclable solid waste collected for 
processing and transfer. To guarantee a minimum stream of revenues for 
the project, the Town of Clarkstown, New York adopted a flow control 
ordinance, allowing the private operator of a transfer station to collect a 
fee of $81 per ton—in excess of the disposal cost of solid waste in the 
Steven Ferrey, Renewable Subsidies in the Age of Deregulation, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Dec. 1997, 
at 22. 
 44. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997). 
 45. Id. at 281–82. 
 46. Id. at 282–83. 
 47. Id. at 310. 
 48. Id. at 301. 
 49. Id. at 300. 
 50. C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
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private market.51 C&A Carbone, Inc. processed solid waste and operated a 
recycling center, as it was permitted to do under the Clarkstown flow 
control ordinance.52 The flow control ordinance required companies like 
Carbone to bring nonrecylable waste to the locally-franchised transfer 
station and to pay a fee, while prohibiting them from shipping the waste 
themselves.53 “[A] financing measure,” the flow control ordinance ensured 
that “the town-sponsored facility will be profitable, so that the local 
contractor can build it and Clarkstown can buy it back at nominal cost in 
five years.”54 The Court reasoned that the local law violates the dormant 
commerce clause because in “practical effect and design” it bars out-of-
state sanitary landfill operators from participating in the local market for 
solid waste disposal.55 In so reasoning, the majority drew from a 1925 
case, written by Justice Brandeis, which held that a statute prohibiting 
“common carriers from using state highways over certain routes without a 
certificate” of convenience and necessity is unconstitutional.56  
If a municipal government itself were to create and own the facility, 
this would bring the monopoly within an exception to the dormant 
commerce clause known as the market-participant exception.57 In creating 
monopolies, however, local governments frequently work with private 
firms, using the advantages of the state—subsidies, below-market interest 
rates from non-taxable bonds, bypassing state or local restrictions on use 
of municipal tax powers, etc.—to assist firms and create incentives for 
them to provide service. Since municipal governments often help to pay 
for even private infrastructure, such as waste disposal facilities, through 
the issuance of bonds, it is understandable that a local government might 
want to create a monopoly to ensure that its facility maintains sufficient 
revenues to cover its costs and to avoid jeopardizing the government’s 
 51. Id. at 386–87. 
 52. Id. at 387–88. 
 53. Id. at 388. 
 54. Id. at 393. 
 55. Id. at 389, 394. 
 56. Id. at 394 (quoting Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1925)). Justice Brandeis 
wrote for the Court: 
[The statute’s] primary purpose is not regulation with a view to safety or to conservation of 
the highways, but the prohibition of competition. It determines not the manner of use, but the 
persons by whom the highways may be used. It prohibits such use to some persons while 
permitting it to others for the same purpose and in the same manner. 
Buck, 267 U.S. at 315–16. 
 57. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436–39 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 
426 U.S. 794, 808–10 (1976). For a survey of the academic literature on the market-participant 
exception, see Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989). 
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bond rating. Such facilities are allowed to collect charges, which serve the 
same basic function as a tax. If the government itself were to build, own 
and operate a facility, the political process would impose a general tax, but 
with private operations subsidized by a state- or locally-enforced 
monopoly, the tax implications of such projects are obscured. The Town 
of Clarkstown, New York, for example, guaranteed revenue for its solid 
waste transfer station—it promised a minimum of 120,000 tons of waste 
per year, allowing the firm to make more than $9.7 million in annual 
revenue for five years—and agreed to buy it for $1 at the end of the 
contract period.58 One way of understanding the Court’s rejection of the 
Clarkstown flow control ordinance is based on its concerns with 
impermissible government-assisted monopolies against the backdrop of 
interstate competition.59 
The basic touchstone guiding judicial intervention under the guise of 
the dormant commerce clause is commonly described as protecting the 
market against discrimination between in- and out-of-state competitors.60 
If recent decisions are taken at face value as supporting such a conception, 
the Supreme Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence might be 
said to embrace a pro-competition stance, consistent with the ideology and 
goals of the neoclassical economics framework, in which law sees its 
primary role as intervening to correct for market failure. In Tracy, for 
example, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated: “The dormant 
commerce clause protects markets and participants in markets, not 
taxpayers as such.”61 He bolstered this vision of the dormant commerce 
clause by referencing the famous words of Justice Jackson:  
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer 
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty 
that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no 
home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will 
by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every 
consumer may look to the free competition from every producing 
 58. 511 U.S. at 387. 
 59. The market-participant exception does not preclude a Commerce Clause challenge to such a 
facility because the exception is limited and is not automatically available where the state could 
expand into the market. To avail itself of the market-participant exception, the state must establish that 
it is a market participant and may not use mere contractual privity to immunize downstream regulatory 
conduct in a market in which it is not a direct participant. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 
467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
 60. Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1191, 1222–23 (1998). 
 61. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997). 
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area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such 
was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this 
Court which has given it reality.62  
This neoclassical view of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence sees 
the role of federal courts as prohibiting states from interfering with the 
economic exchange of a free market economy.63 On this view, the primary 
purpose of judicial intervention is to guard against state and local 
government balkanization by protecting free trade from state government 
interference in the external market.  
However, it is misleading to read the dormant commerce clause as a 
constitutional mandate for competition, let alone deregulation. As dormant 
commerce clause jurisprudence itself recognizes, there are exceptions to 
the dormant commerce clause where the state itself takes on the role of 
market participant.64 Further, the dormant commerce clause allows 
substantial state government intervention in the setting of prices, subsidies, 
and taxes, so long as a state does not engage in differential treatment in the 
same market in ways that burden interstate competition.65 Moreover, since 
the dormant commerce clause is not derived from the express language of 
the U.S. Constitution, Congress retains the power to override it by 
adopting a national policy that preempts, or overrides, the competitive 
market between individual states.66 For example, under the Commerce 
Clause, Congress has the express authority to establish an agency such as 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), giving it jurisdiction to 
regulate railroad rates previously left to individual states.67 Congress also 
may authorize national ownership of infrastructure, as it did in creating the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and countless other national firms, and 
may opt to preclude competition in an industry altogether.68 “Our 
Constitution,” the late Julian Eule has written, “did not attempt to solve 
economic parochialism by an express prohibition against interference with 
 62. Id. at 299–300 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)). 
 63. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 
(1982); Steven G. Gey, The Political Economy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 1 (1989–90); McGreal, supra note 60.  
 64. See supra notes 57 and 59. 
 65. See supra notes 44–62 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Chen, supra note 19. 
 67. For discussion, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, 
at 164–67 (1991). 
 68. For discussion, see Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory 
Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1451–52 (2000). 
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free trade. Instead, it shifted legislative power over economic matters that 
affect more than one state to a single national body.”69  
To take a more modern example than the now-defunct ICC railroad 
regulation regime or TVA, Congress has created FERC, which has made a 
major policy choice to implement competitive regional wholesale power 
markets.70 Congress has the power to override FERC’s decision, but 
despite concerns with state-led regulatory policies, as in California, no one 
has seriously proposed a congressional repeal of national deregulation 
policies in electric power. Alternatively, as others have proposed, 
Congress might expand FERC’s jurisdiction, taking some or all regulatory 
authority over retail markets away from state regulators.71 If Congress 
were to do so, by occupying the lawmaking field it might preclude states 
from enacting some laws that discriminate against out-of-state suppliers in 
deregulated wholesale markets. But—and this remains an important source 
of legitimacy for the dormant commerce clause—Congress has not done 
so.72 Congress’s inaction, however, does not mean that preemption plays 
no role in this context. In a sense, Congress’s acquiescence in FERC’s 
competitive policies preempts individual states from acting in ways that 
impair commerce between the states. Absent a change in federal policy, 
state efforts to curtail competition in wholesale electric power markets 
could be suspect under the dormant commerce clause to the extent that 
they undermine the interstate markets created by FERC.  
While a federal preemption argument for interstate market norms is 
based in a positive legal source of congressional or federal agency 
enactments which preclude contrary state laws, preservation of the status 
quo under the dormant commerce clause also finds some source in the 
cooperative behavior between two or more states that have adopted a 
competitive norm of exchange in which Congress acquiesces. Many have 
suggested that the neoclassical account of the dormant commerce clause—
as a legal source of free trade policies between the states—is flawed.73 An 
alternative view understands judicial intervention under the dormant 
 69. Eule, supra note 63, at 430. 
 70. See Promoting Wholesale Competition, supra note 39. 
 71. See, e.g., Pierce, Competitive Markets, supra note 5 (proposing increased federal authority 
over transmission line siting).  
 72. As Jim Chen observes: 
Congress’s persistent failure to repeal the dormant Commerce Clause is the singularly 
impressive feature of American constitutionalism’s approach to protecting free trade. Though 
it has failed to win academic support, congressional silence provides at least an adequate and 
perhaps even a persuasive case for preserving the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Chen, supra note 19, at 1769. 
 73. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 63. 
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commerce clause not as inherently protecting competition itself, let alone 
free markets, but as protecting a political process that makes markets 
possible. On this view, the dormant commerce clause is as much about 
political failures as it is about market failure.  
For instance, in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,74 the Supreme 
Court struck down a Massachusetts tax and rebate scheme for milk that 
operated neutrally without regard to the milk’s place of origin because the 
tax revenue went into a subsidy fund distributed solely to Massachusetts 
milk producers. In writing for the majority, Justice Stevens embraced a 
political process account of the dormant commerce clause, in which its 
role is seen as representative-enforcing in a manner similar to United 
States v. Carolene Product’s famous footnote four.75 As Justice Stevens 
remarked in striking down the tax and subsidy regime in West Lynn 
Creamery: 
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here, 
are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate 
commerce, in part because “[t]he existence of major in-state 
interests adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against 
legislative abuse.” However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is 
coupled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a State’s 
political process can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative 
abuse, because one of the in-state interests which would otherwise 
lobby against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.76 
Rather than inherently protecting competition and free markets, the 
purposes of dormant commerce clause doctrine can be understood within 
the frameworks of Madisonian democracy as well as efficiency—
specifically, as limiting welfare-reducing interest-group rent-seeking in the 
state regulatory process.  
This political process account of the dormant commerce clause 
converges with a bargaining approach that understands lawmaking as a 
type of negotiated, but incomplete, contract. The Compact Clause of the 
Constitution prevents states from entering into bilateral or multilateral 
agreements absent congressional approval.77 Even absent formal 
 74. 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
 75. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). John Hart Ely has applied the 
representation-reinforcing role of Carolene Products to equal protection jurisprudence. See JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).  
 76. 512 U.S. at 200 (alterations in original) (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Minnesota 
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)). 
 77. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/3
p521 Rossi book pages.doc11/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] POLITICAL BARGAINING 537 
 
 
 
 
 
 
agreement under the Compact Clause, states may informally undertake a 
coordinated pro-commerce regime.78 In this scenario, a single state—or 
powerful interest groups within a single state—may seek to appropriate 
rents by enacting legislation that is intended to defeat the coordinated 
regime.79 The commons problems80 created by jurisdictional overlaps 
between federal and state regulation create a need for gap-filling measures 
but also simultaneously provide the opportunity for powerful firms to 
influence the state lawmaking process to advance their self-interest. 
Individual state defectors can cause a divergence between ex ante and ex 
post expectations in maintaining the implicit cooperative norm between 
the states.  
Drawing from this basic account of interstate coordination, Paul 
McGreal has argued that the dormant commerce clause is best understood 
as a solution to a Prisoner’s Dilemma defection, where individual states 
(as well as the interest groups which demand state regulation) stand to 
gain by defecting rather than cooperating with market exchange norms.81 
Maxwell Stearns takes this argument a step further, presenting the 
coordinated norm of competition as a Nash equilibrium, in order to 
account for why only certain kinds of rent seeking are condemned under 
the dormant commerce clause.82 A Nash equilibrium is a unique solution 
or set of available solutions that are stable, in the sense that they maximize 
payoffs for each player given the expected strategies of other players in the 
absence of formal cooperation.83 An individual state’s effort to enact 
regulations, tariffs, or subsidies that are designed to appropriate the gains 
of the pro-commerce regime is non-Nash. As Stearns argues, a court 
striking state legislation under the dormant commerce clause “facilitates a 
benign multiple Nash equilibrium game, one that presumptively takes 
strategies inducing a mixed-strategy equilibrium outcome off the table, but 
that also effectively ratifies the choice of the early movants followed by 
other states.”84 The Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence 
into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”). 
 78. See Maxell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. McGreal, supra note 60, at 1245–79. 
 82. Stearns, supra note 78. 
 83. See ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 23 
(2d ed. 1994).  
 84. Stearns, supra note 78, at 12. 
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values commonality in market norms between the states over any 
individual state’s particular regulatory choice.  
In effect the Court tells the state whose law is under review that 
while the states are free to choose any of two or more available pure 
Nash equilibrium outcomes, individual states are not free, after a 
common regime is in place, to supplant other states’ pure Nash 
equilibrium outcome with a mixed-strategy equilibrium, at least 
absent a sufficient demonstration that the nonconforming state’s 
motivation is other than to disrupt a pure Nash equilibrium 
strategy.85  
On this account, the dormant commerce clause responds to an implicit 
bargaining failure in the market for inter-jurisdictional regulation. Its 
primary concern is with protecting interstate cooperation in lawmaking, 
not competition per se. In a world of low bargaining costs, the optimal 
level of interstate regulation might be expected to arise, but in actuality 
interstate bargaining for regulation is costly and rarely occurs. For 
example, it may be costly for a net wine-producing state, like California, 
to negotiate ex ante with a net wine-consuming state like New York for 
lower regulations or taxes and the low expected gains of such negotiation 
may not justify the costs of bargaining. A Coasean bargain for the optimal 
level of regulation can fail where there is imperfect information about 
preferences or the number of affected jurisdictions is large.86 At the same 
time, if left to their own internal devices, states may face incentives from 
interest groups to pass regulations or taxes that impose spillover costs on 
producers or consumers in other jurisdictions. By internalizing spillover 
costs, the dormant commerce clause might be understood as restoring the 
conditions that make tacit cooperation, or implicit bargains, between states 
more likely.  
B. Implications for Public Utility Regulation in New Markets 
This is an important insight for regulatory law. Unlike the traditional 
public choice critique of regulation—which sees judicial intervention in 
public law as necessary to condemn rent seeking87—the political process 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. On the economic theory of regulation, see Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among 
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1984); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More 
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic 
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
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account of the dormant commerce clause targets only those laws that 
restrain commerce pursuant to implicit or explicit contracts between other 
states. The U.S. Congress and states are allowed to adopt rent-seeking 
legislation, in the forms of regulation, subsidies, and taxes. However, an 
individual state cannot enact a law that undermines a desirable pro-
commerce regime that has been put into place through the implicit or 
explicit cooperation of states, any more than it can undermine a pro-
commerce regime adopted formally by Congress or a federal agency 
(under the preemption doctrine). 
As an illustration, in the context of deregulated wholesale power 
markets, individual states frequently face strong incentives to defect in 
order to protect firms in their own internal market, such as local utilities. 
Several states have adopted moratoria on exempt wholesale generators 
(power plants that are not owned by incumbent utilities but will sell power 
in interstate commerce),88 or have limited the siting of such plants to in-
state utilities only.89 Florida’s Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted 
a state power plant siting statute to limit plant siting to those suppliers who 
are Florida utilities or who have contracts with Florida utilities.90 Perhaps 
taking a cue from Florida’s success in blocking the development of new 
wholesale power plants that do not directly serve in-state customers, other 
state and local governments, particularly in the Southern U.S., have 
imposed moratoria on merchant plants.91  
States have also attempted to block the siting of merchant interstate 
transmission lines, necessary for reliable wholesale power supply markets. 
For example, regulatory officials in the state of Connecticut have strongly 
opposed the Cross Sound Cable, a 23-mile merchant transmission line that 
would allow Long Island Power Authority to import power to Brook 
Haven, New York from New Haven, Connecticut, leading to significant 
delays in the operation of the transmission line.92 The project was built in 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
 88. See supra note 42 (referencing state and local government moratoria). 
 89. See, e.g., Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision Without Site; Site Without Vision, 
ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2003, at 23; Pierce, Environmental Regulation, supra note 5. 
 90. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000) (holding that state’s power plant 
siting statute “was not intended to authorize the determination of need for a proposed power plant 
output that is not fully committed to use by Florida customers who purchase electrical power at retail 
rates”). 
 91. Chris Deisinger, The Backlash Against Merchant Plants and the Need for a New Regulatory 
Model, 13 ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 2000, at 51; Nervous of NOx, Southern Govs. Put Plants on Hold, 
ELECTRICITY DAILY, Aug. 28, 2001; State Limits on Merchant Plants a Growing Worry, GENERATION 
WKLY., Aug. 22, 2001. 
 92. See infra notes 93–107 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p521 Rossi book pages.doc11/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
540 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:521 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002, following the FERC’s approval of retail sales at negotiated 
transmission rates,93 as well as permit approvals by the Army Corp of 
Engineers, the New York Public Service Commission, the Connecticut 
Siting Council, and the Connecticut Department of Environmental 
Protection.94 It complied with all state siting and environmental statutes, 
except for a provision of its state-issued permit which required its lines to 
be buried at a certain depth. Expansion of transmission access to locations 
such as New York City would provide important capacity, and may have 
helped in absorbing some of the transmission shortages that exacerbated 
the Summer 2003 blackout.95 In burying the transmission line, the project 
sponsor discovered hard sediments and bedrock protrusions along portions 
of the route. Some Connecticut officials cited environmental concerns in 
support of their opposition to the project, such as impacts on shellfish beds 
and dredging operations into the New Haven Harbor. The transmission 
line was built, however, and according to the project’s CEO the line was 
“buried to the permit depth along 98 percent of the entire span, and over 
90% of the route within the Federal Channel to an average of 50.7 feet 
below mean lower low water, well below the required level of minus 48 
feet.”96 
Nevertheless, a Connecticut official’s vocal opposition kept the 
transmission line from becoming operational until 2004.97 This may be a 
well-intended dispute over environmental regulation, but the line was not 
opposed only by environmental interests in the state of Connecticut. As 
often is the case when a regulatory body blocks a new entrant into a state’s 
power industry, there is also an anti-competitive angle to opposition to the 
Cross Sound line. Northeast Utilities, a major investor-owned utility 
whose customers reside primarily in Connecticut (and which also services 
customers in Massachusetts and New Hampshire), owns an older, 
competing transmission line (the 1385 cable) that runs parallel to the Cross 
Sound Cable, and supports expanding that facility over the new 
 93. TransEnergie U.S., Ltd., 91 FERC ¶ 61,230 (2000). 
 94. See Regional Energy Reliability and Security: DOE Authority to Energize the Cross Sound 
Cable: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 108th Cong. 55–56 (2004) (statement of Jeffrey A. Donahue, Chairman and CEO Cross 
Sound Cable Company, LLC) [hereinafter Donahue statement]. 
 95. The technical advantage to operating two transmission lines between Connecticut and Long 
Island, as opposed to one, is that this would allow electric power to travel in a semi-circular loop—in 
and out of Long Island, depending on load. 
 96. Donahue statement, supra note 94, at 56. 
 97. Bruce W. Radford, Cross-Sound Cable Puts Feds on the Spot, FORTNIGHTLY’S SPARK, June 
2004, at 1, available at http://www.pur.com/pubs/spark/jun04.pdf. 
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transmission line.98 Northeast Utilities favored updating its line over 
approving the Cross Sound line, with which it would compete, and has 
requested FERC to use its authority under Section 210 of the FPA to order 
New York to assist in replacing the 1385 cable.99 
After the Cross Sound transmission line was built, Connecticut passed 
a moratorium on the siting of new or expanded transmission lines across 
Long Island Sound,100 effectively limiting the ability of the project’s 
sponsors to make the project comply with Connecticut’s understanding of 
the permits.101 The Cross Sound Cable was authorized to operate under an 
emergency order issued by the U.S. Secretary of Energy following the 
August 2003 blackout, but that order was lifted in early 2004, leaving the 
Cross Sound line without permission to go live.102 So, effectively, the 
Cross Sound Cable was completed in 2002, but remained dormant as a 
permanent transmission alternative until Summer 2004, due to a regulatory 
impasse between the state of Connecticut, on the one hand, and the Cross 
Sound project’s investors and the state of New York, on the other. As 
FERC Chairman Pat Wood indicated before Congress in May 2004, 
federal regulators lack authority to resolve the issue, given state and local 
jurisdiction over transmission-line siting.103 FERC has embraced 
wholesale deregulation, but FERC has lacked the authority to preempt the 
state environmental siting process over the transmission line.104 
Connecticut’s Attorney General, backed by environmental interest groups 
and Northeast Utilities, threatened litigation if the Cross Sound line is 
allowed to go live again, instead favoring expansion of the existing 
transmission line, owned by Northeast Utilities.105 Only when FERC 
threatened to approve expansion of the 1385 cable was FERC able to force 
the parties to the bargaining table.106 FERC could not preempt the states 
and mandate operation of the Cross Sound transmission line, but the threat 
 98. Id. at 11. 
 99. Donahue statement, supra note 94, at 56.  
 100. Moratorium on Grid Projects, supra note 42. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Under Section 202(c) of the FPA, the U.S. Secretary of Energy can mandate operation of a 
transmission line over objections of state regulators, but only in the context of an emergency—not 
where it is merely found to be in the public interest. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (2005). 
 103. Regional Energy Reliability and Security: DOE Authority to Energize the Cross Sound 
Cable: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 108th Cong. 40–42 (2004) (statement of Patrick Wood, III, Chairman FERC). 
 104. In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress extended to FERC “back stop” authority to 
preempt state transmission line siting procedures in limited circumstances.  
 105. Radford, supra note 97, at 1. 
 106. Parties Set Deal to Energize Cross Sound Cable, INSIDE F.E.R.C., June 28, 2004, at 1. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p521 Rossi book pages.doc11/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
542 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:521 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of it making a decision elsewhere led stakeholders to negotiate a 
settlement, allowing the line to operate.107  
As in the context of the Connecticut transmission line dispute, to the 
extent that transmission remains entirely within the control of state, rather 
than federal, regulators, states may have strong incentives to protect their 
own incumbent firms or citizens, rather than supporting cooperative 
efforts to expand transmission. Indeed, Suffolk County, New York sued 
the state of Connecticut, claiming that its moratorium and other efforts to 
block the new transmission line violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.108 A political process account of the dormant commerce 
clause would suggest that judicial deference to Connecticut’s claim of 
state environmental benefits is inappropriate. In a dormant commerce 
clause challenge to the Connecticut siting dispute, federal courts would 
need to carefully scrutinize the claims of environmental protection. Given 
that the project was already built, concerns with allowing the line to 
become operational seem highly suspect. By defecting from the norm of 
interstate cooperation in supporting the growth of transmission 
infrastructure to serve the national market, Connecticut was disrupting the 
cooperative equilibrium that exists among states (here a cooperative 
equilibrium that supports increased competition). 
To be sure, some rent transfers are permissible, if not desirable, in the 
state political process. For example, rent-seeking in the form of a neutral 
corporate tax exemption for utilities, or rent-seeking in the setting of 
utility rates to favor industrial growth, is likely permissible, and subject 
only to the safeguards of the state political process. However, rent-seeking 
in the form of exclusionary regulation that limits access to the interstate 
market is more suspect as an economic matter where market exchange is 
the cooperative background norm. Florida’s Supreme Court rejected a 
dormant commerce clause challenge to the use of the state’s restrictive 
power plant siting statute to restrict the building of new plants by out-of-
state suppliers.109 However, since the dormant commerce clause challenge 
was only litigated before the Florida Supreme Court,110 the inadequacy of 
 107. Bruce Lambert, New York and Connecticut Agree to End Cable Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, June 
25, 2004, at B6. Interestingly, the most vocal opponent of the transmission line, Connecticut Attorney 
General Richard Blumenthal, was excluded from the negotiations. Michele Jacklin, Editorial, They 
Can Bury the Cable, but Not the Controversy, HARTFORD COURANT, July 7, 2004, at A9. 
 108. See N.Y. County Sues Connecticut, Says Blocking Merchant Line Violates Commerce Clause, 
POWER MARKETS WK., May 31, 2004, at 23. Given that, in Summer 2004, a settlement allowed the 
line to go operational, this suit was withdrawn. 
 109. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 436 (Fla. 2000). 
 110. Below, the Florida Public Service Commission allowed siting of the power plant, and in 
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a state court record establishing discrimination against out-of-state 
suppliers probably made this argument less compelling than it could have 
been. At a minimum, dormant commerce clause jurisprudence would 
require states to explain how legislation restricting power supply in the 
wholesale market or transmission expansion might serve benign purposes 
of environmental or consumer protection. 
It is more difficult to assess the constitutional status of state- or local-
franchised monopolies under the dormant commerce clause. On the 
political process account, the Town of Clarkstown, New York violated the 
dormant commerce clause by granting a monopoly that imposed a veiled 
tax on users of waste disposal outside of the locally-sponsored facility, 
including outside the state.111 Its monopoly franchise was invalidated. In 
Carbone, Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Blackmun, arguing that the majority had ignored the 
distinction between private and public enterprise and that the flow control 
ordinance monopoly is easily distinguished from the “entrepreneurial 
favoritism [the Court has] previously defined and condemned as 
protectionist.”112 On the traditional account of judicial intervention, it is 
unclear what distinguishes this monopoly from a constitutionally 
permissible state or local monopoly. 
A political process bargaining account of judicial intervention under 
the dormant commerce clause would suggest why electric, natural gas, and 
telecommunications monopolies will not necessarily fail constitutional 
evaluation if they refuse to open their service territories and network 
facilities to competitors. The historical lack of a background norm of 
competition excuses many historical monopolies from the constitutional 
reach of the dormant commerce clause: If there is no interstate market, a 
state or locally imposed monopoly cannot discriminate against out-of-state 
commerce. With the development of interstate markets in 
telecommunications and electric power, however, more difficult questions 
emerge. For example, it might be unconstitutional for a utility to impose a 
surcharge on all users of distribution service, regardless of whether they 
purchase their power from local or out-of-state suppliers.  
doing so made no specific findings of discrimination in violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 431–
32. 
 111. See supra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
 112. C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 416 (Souter, J., dissenting). According 
to Justice Souter’s dissent, “[t]he Commerce Clause was not passed to save the citizens of Clarkstown 
from themselves.” Id. at 430. Thus, the dissent rejects extending the political process account beyond 
scenarios that discriminate between local and out-of-town participants. 
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If a municipality, such as the Town of Clarkstown, operates a 
government-owned monopoly over telecommunications or electric 
distribution service, the market-participant exception shields its conduct 
from the reach of the dormant commerce clause.113 Franchised private 
utilities—such as investor-owned utilities—pose a potential problem but 
are not necessarily unconstitutional, even under the political process 
account of the dormant commerce clause. The political process account, 
however, warns state and local governments to approach the financing of 
such operations with care. In Carbone, the Town of Clarkstown promised 
to make up losses from operating the transfer facility at competitive rates, 
presumably by taking these losses out of its general revenues.114 What the 
dormant commerce clause seems to prohibit is a local government 
explicitly indemnifying a private monopoly out of the public fisc, even 
where it imposes the same monopoly and fees on both in- and out-of-state 
providers of service. The Takings Clause does not require governments to 
take on such obligations,115 but the dormant commerce clause may prohibit 
them if they are the result of rent seeking that imposes burdens on 
interstate cooperation regarding the optimal level of regulation.116 Further, 
as in Carbone, authorizing above-market fees solely for purposes of 
maintaining the monopoly may be constitutionally suspect. As we move 
from local to state monopoly franchises, concerns with a single firm 
capturing the political process are weaker—a single firm that dominates 
municipal politics may have little power in state-wide regulatory and 
political processes—so state-franchised monopolies may be more likely to 
pass constitutional muster. But even neutral financing arrangements may 
be suspect if they favor local enterprise and have the “practical effect and 
design”117 of impeding the evolution of cooperative interstate 
lawmaking.118  
If, however, one state approves retail competition while adjacent states 
do not, the political process bargaining account does not advise judicial 
intervention. While a handful of states may “defect” from interstate 
cooperation by embracing competitive mechanisms (such as “retail 
wheeling”),119 this is not the type of uncooperative state lawmaking that 
 113. See sources cited supra note 57. 
 114. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 115. Instead, the Takings Clause serves to prohibit governmental overreaching. 
 116. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text (summarizing the argument based on 
interstate cooperation). 
 117. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394. 
 118. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 43. 
 119. See Kelly A. Karn, Note, State Electric Restructuring: Are Retail Wheeling and Reciprocity 
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requires judicial intervention to protect against spillover effects for non-
participants. Powerful incumbent in-state monopolies could be expected to 
oppose such measures in the state political process, so nothing would be 
gained by judicial intervention to safeguard against such laws.  
II. JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING AND STATE-ACTION IMMUNITY FROM 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
While the dormant commerce clause is an affirmative restriction on 
state power to act derived from the Constitution, state-action immunity 
serves as a defense from antitrust enforcement. State-action immunity 
suspends federal antitrust enforcement under the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts120—statutes designed to enhance competition and free trade norms—
where a state actively supervises the private activity.121 This judicially-
created antitrust defense originated when the Supreme Court rejected a 
Sherman Act challenge to a California marketing program brought by a 
grower because the program “derived its authority and its efficacy from 
the legislative command of the state.”122 By serving as a “filter” (or 
“gatekeeper”) for judicial scrutiny of private conduct,123 such immunity 
serves the federalism purpose of facilitating participation in the state 
regulatory process124 which lends legitimacy to the development of 
regulation.125  
Provisions Constitutional?, 33 IND. L. REV. 631 (2000) (arguing that state laws that allow retail 
wheeling with out-of-state suppliers only on conditions of reciprocity would fail to withstand dormant 
commerce clause scrutiny).  
 120. See, e.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); City of Columbia v. Omni 
Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 
471 U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 
U.S. 558 (1984); New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Bates v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).  
 121. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) 
(refusing to grant state action immunity where the program at issue was not actively supervised by the 
state).  
 122. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350. 
 123. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
 124. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action 
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1997). 
 125. State-action immunity also may serve a judicial-avoidance purpose, providing federal courts 
a way of disposing of complex and technical issues, especially in ways that have a binding impact on 
state law. However, other legal doctrines, such as abstention (which advises federal courts to abstain 
from exercising jurisdiction out of comity) adequately avoid the precedent-creating risk of federal 
court review of state regulation. Abstention can be invoked where a federal court is making a decision 
that has a binding effect on state law. By contrast, with antitrust litigation courts are not normally 
passing judgments on the lawfulness of state regulation, but are focused on the merits of private 
conduct under federal law. 
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The impact of a court making a decision not to apply state-action 
immunity is not to invalidate a state or local regulation, but to subject 
private conduct that complies with (or is envisioned by) regulation to 
antitrust scrutiny. Thus, courts evaluating state or local regulation in the 
context of state-action immunity should be expected to be less, not more, 
deferential to decentralized politics. In addition, to the extent a finding of 
state-action immunity provides private firms engaging in certain types of 
conduct an absolute defense from antitrust liability, it encourages the 
formation of state monopolies, or monopolistic conduct, where states 
intend to take private conduct outside of the pale of antitrust enforcement. 
Given this, state-action immunity presents a particularly compelling case 
for careful judicial scrutiny of state and local regulation. However, courts 
are almost oblivious to such concerns and frequently embrace overbroad 
judicial deference in the state-action-immunity context.126  
A. Midcal and Other Smoke Signals from the Supreme Court 
In applying state-action immunity, the Supreme Court has adopted a 
two-part test to determine which state regulation is exempt from antitrust 
enforcement: “First, the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’; second, the policy 
must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”127 This test seems simple 
enough. Only if a state law expressly envisions monopolistic conduct and 
if the state actively supervises such conduct, will the conduct escape 
antitrust enforcement. In application, though, courts have struggled in 
applying state-action immunity, often because different bodies within a 
state take on the regulatory role and because the nature of regulation varies 
so much from industry to industry. While state-action immunity might be 
intended to create a safe harbor for state and local politics, judicial 
decisions invoking it are hardly consistent or principled. The Supreme 
Court’s current approach to state-action immunity also seems to ignore 
how judicial deference in this context can create incentives in the state and 
local lawmaking process that are harmful to social welfare. 
Application of state-action immunity to local governments, such as 
municipal bodies, as opposed to states, has presented a difficult challenge 
for courts.128 Local government lawmaking perhaps provides the most 
 126. See FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 14. 
 127. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (citation 
omitted). 
 128. Commentary on the applicability of state action immunity to local governments is abundant. 
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salient opportunity for extension of the political process insights of 
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence to the state-action-immunity 
context in antitrust law. In a short-lived line of cases, the Supreme Court 
read state-action immunity narrowly in the context of municipal (as 
opposed to state) regulation. Community Communications Co. v. City of 
Boulder, Colorado,129 for example, subjected municipal governments to 
antitrust enforcement for monopolistic conduct. Speaking for the majority, 
Justice Brennan distinguished between states regulating as states—entitled 
to the state action defense under a federalism rationale—and as political 
subdivisions—exempt from antitrust enforcement only insofar as they are 
implementing state policy, but not when they are acting as municipal 
governments only.130 The City of Boulder’s moratorium on cable 
television expansion was thus subject to antitrust challenge because 
Colorado, at the state level, had not clearly expressed a policy to regulate 
cable television; in fact, Justice Brennan thought it apparent that Colorado 
had no state-wide policy at all—that there was a gap in state regulation.131  
This rationale for narrowing the availability of the state action defense 
for municipal governments is striking in its similarity to the political 
process account of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Like the 
constitutionally suspect municipally franchised monopoly in Carbone, 
which the Court believed to impair external market competition, the City 
of Boulder’s moratorium on cable effectuates a tax on its citizens that goes 
too far. This impairs competition in the internal (intrastate) market, as well 
as perhaps in the external (interstate) market. As such, a certain 
convergence between the dormant commerce clause and state-action 
immunity informs the Court’s skepticism about local regulation in this line 
of cases. To the extent that both the dormant commerce clause and state-
action immunity emphasize the incentives private firms face in bargaining 
in the law-making process with state and local governments, a narrow 
See, e.g., John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the “State-Municipal Action” Antitrust Cases, 61 
TEX. L. REV. 481 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 23 (1983); Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust State-Action Doctrine After Fisher v. Berkeley, 39 
VAND. L. REV. 1257 (1986); Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and 
Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1985); John E. Lopatka, State Action and Municipal 
Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (1984); Glen O. Robinson, The 
Sherman Act as a Home Rule Charter: Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 2 
SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 131 (1983); C. Paul Rogers III, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a Federalist 
System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305. 
 129. Cmty. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). 
 130. Id. at 52–56. 
 131. Id. at 54–55. Justice Brennan was clear that “mere neutrality” by the state regarding 
municipal regulation does not suffice. Instead, a “clear articulation and affirmative expression” to 
replace antitrust enforcement with regulation is necessary. Id. at 55.  
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reading of state-action immunity from antitrust enforcement against 
private firms is justified in the municipal context for the very same reasons 
that the political process account of the dormant commerce clause makes 
sense.132 
A more recent line of cases, however, departs from the municipal-state 
distinction in antitrust immunity that Justice Brennan laid down in the 
context of cable television regulation.133 In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau 
Claire,134 the Court abandoned the clear-articulation requirement in 
assessing municipal state-action immunity. Instead, Justice Powell 
reasoned in his majority opinion, as long as a state confers permissive 
authority in general terms for a municipality to deal with a matter within 
the municipal government’s discretion, this is sufficient to exclude the 
conduct from antitrust enforcement.135 Thus, when the state of Wisconsin 
granted municipalities the authority to establish sewage treatment plants, 
this impliedly granted municipal government the power to make decisions 
about who would be served. Justice Powell recognized that municipalities 
may exercise “purely parochial public interests” which, at some level, 
could be subject to antitrust enforcement.136 In his view, however, a state 
delegation to a municipal government is sufficient to meet the clearly 
expressed and fully articulated criterion of the state-action immunity test, 
which reading exempts from antitrust enforcement a large range of 
municipal regulation.137 Under this approach, an “express mention” by a 
legislature of an intent to displace competition is not necessary (although 
perhaps it would be sufficient); instead, the Court suggests, what matters is 
that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct is a “foreseeable result” of the 
state policy.138 
In addition, at least in the original Midcal formulation, state-action 
immunity requires courts to determine how active and involved a 
regulatory scheme must be for purposes of deeming it “active 
 132. Reacting to the prospect of liability created by City of Boulder, Congress abolished money 
damage liability under the antitrust laws for municipalities, their officials, and private persons acting 
under the direction of local governments and their officials in the Local Government Antitrust Act of 
1984. See H.R. REP. NO. 98–965, at 18–19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4619–20. 
Congress continued, however, to authorize antitrust liability for private conduct that is sanctioned or 
authorized by municipal governments. 
 133. See infra notes 134–38 and accompanying text. 
 134. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985). 
 135. Id. at 46. 
 136. Id. at 47. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 41–42. 
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supervision.”139 In Hallie, however, the Supreme Court effectively 
abandoned the requirement of active state supervision, at least insofar as it 
applies to municipalities.140 In so holding, the Court explained that the 
purpose of state supervision is to ensure that regulatory policies are 
pursued for public purposes and not to enrich private actors. According to 
the Court, “Where a private party is engaging in the anticompetitive 
activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, 
rather than the governmental interests of the State.”141 But, if a state has 
clearly authorized a municipality to act, the Court reasoned that there is no 
such problem. Instead, the “only real danger is that it will seek to further 
purely parochial public interests at the expense of more overriding state 
goals.”142 Thus, if it is clear that state authorization exists, either expressly 
or by virtue of foreseeable results, the Court held that there is no need to 
make a finding that the state actively supervises the municipality’s 
regulation of the private activity.143 
While this approach envisions an inquiry into the “foreseeable results” 
of policy adopted by a state legislative body, it does not define what the 
inquiry would entail.144 Appellate courts following this approach invoke 
state-action immunity based almost exclusively on a clear legislative 
purpose, or a clear statement to displace competition or antitrust 
enforcement by courts.145 Beyond this, however, they generally engage in 
judicial restraint, deferring to state regulation of public utility monopolies 
under the antitrust laws.146 Deference has its appeal in a complex 
regulatory environment, but the Court’s relaxation of a state supervision 
requirement for municipalities is counterintuitive if not incoherent. The 
premise that municipal regulation is not likely to be captured by private 
interests at the expense of the public good ignores the high risk of interest 
group capture at the local level, where the incentives for ex ante lobbying 
of the regulator are perhaps strongest. At the local level, the costs to firms 
of organizing and lobbying regulators are much lower than at the state 
 139. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980). 
 140. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46–47 (1985). 
 141. Id. at 47. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  
 144. For a discussion of this aspect of Hallie, see Elizabeth Trujillo, The Hidden Prong of the 
Midcal Test: A New Look at State Action as the Pendulum Shifts Towards Deregulation of the 
Electrical Markets, 83 DENV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).  
 145. See supra notes 134–43 and accompanying text. 
 146. Id. See also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985) (“Once it is clear 
that state authorization exists, there is no need to require the state to supervise activity the 
municipality’s execution of what is a properly delegated function.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p521 Rossi book pages.doc11/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
550 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:521 
 
 
 
 
 
 
level.147 Although the Court seems to embrace a federalism-based 
formalism as a rationale for deference to municipal regulation, this 
account of federalism proves too much. Such a stance can result in state 
delegation to municipal governments with no strings attached, insulating 
private behavior at the local level from almost all antitrust enforcement. 
Further, it places focus on the mere formalistic articulation of state goals 
by a state body, without addressing their purpose. States, as well as 
municipal governments, sometimes regulate in ways that allow private 
interests to place their own economic well-being ahead of the public good. 
Allowing the law to insulate such private conduct from antitrust scrutiny 
may have serious consequences in deregulated markets. 
The Court’s state-action immunity cases in the context of municipal 
regulation seem to view the clear-articulation and active-supervision 
requirements as one and the same, or as collapsing into a one-step 
foreseeability test.148 In a more recent case on the topic, however, the 
Court has made it clear that the active-supervision requirement is alive and 
well as an independent criterion where the conduct of state, as opposed to 
municipal, regulators is at issue.149 The Court’s decision nonetheless raises 
many questions about the scope of application of this test to many private 
arrangements in deregulated markets. In FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance 
Co.,150 the Court addressed the application of state-action immunity to the 
rate-setting activities of title insurance companies in several states. Most 
of the states regulating the title insurance defendants permitted private 
insurers to jointly file rates, which state officials could reject or allow to 
remain in effect.151 The record of the case suggested that no significant 
review of the rates actually took place by these states.152 The FTC had 
conceded that the state statutes authorizing the acceptance of jointly filed 
rates met the clear-articulation requirement,153 but the Court found the 
agency’s review did not constitute active supervision and thus failed the 
 147. One would expect a powerful firm at the local level to hold more influence over elected 
officials than at the state level. 
 148. See Trujillo, supra note 144. 
 149. See infra notes 150–55 and accompanying text. 
 150. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992). 
 151. Id. at 629–31.  
 152. Id. In Wisconsin, for example, no rate hearings had occurred. Id. at 630. 
 153. Id. at 631. In the decision below, the Third Circuit, following a First Circuit decision, held 
that the existence of a funded and authorized state program met the active-supervision requirement. 
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 922 F.2d 1122, 1136 (3d Cir. 1991) (following New Eng. Motor Rate 
Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
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second step of Midcal.154 Hence, the Court concluded, the allegedly 
anticompetitive acts of the insurers could be challenged.155 
B. Hazy Signals from Appellate Courts in Restructured Markets 
Since state-action immunity serves a gatekeeping function for antitrust 
enforcement, the defense will increasingly play an important role as 
formerly regulated firms are deregulated.156 Yet, according to most 
appellate courts, the gates of antitrust enforcement remain closed, allowing 
the conduct of many private firms to escape antitrust scrutiny altogether in 
emerging competitive markets. Despite Ticor’s signal that the active 
supervision requirement is alive and well, lower courts—especially the 
Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits—generally have continued to take a 
deferential approach to state-action immunity in reviewing state regulation 
in deregulated markets. Even where state, not local, regulation is at issue 
and even where competitive markets for service are emerging, these courts 
are not inclined to allow the Sherman Act to apply to private conduct in 
formerly regulated industries where there is some state regulatory scheme, 
however incomplete it is.  
Illustrating this deferential and narrowing approach to judicial 
intervention, the Tenth Circuit has embraced particularly broad antitrust 
immunity for electric utilities, despite the introduction of competition into 
large segments of the industry. For example, the Tenth Circuit extended 
antitrust immunity to Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company’s (OG&E) 
conduct based on evidence that the state regulatory agency had “general 
supervision” authority over the utility, “including the power to fix all of 
OG&E’s rates for electricity and to promulgate all the rules and 
regulations that affect OG&E’s services, operation, and management.”157 
The Tenth Circuit deemed a state agency’s power to engage in review 
alone as sufficient for applying state-action immunity, effectively 
rendering the active-supervision requirement meaningless.158 While the 
court cited a previous case which “found that the use of similar authority 
over an electric utility satisfied the active supervision requirement”159 as a 
 154. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640 (1992). 
 155. Id. at 647. 
 156. See Jeffery D. Schwartz, Comment, The Use of Antitrust State Action Doctrine in the 
Deregulated Electric Utility Industry, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1449 (1999).  
 157. Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th 
Cir. 2001). 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. (citing Lease Lights, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 849 F.2d 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 
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basis for this conclusion, it made no effort whatsoever to discern evidence 
of the affirmative use of such authority by the regulator with respect to the 
utility whose conduct was at issue.160 
The Eighth Circuit has taken a similarly deferential approach to state-
action immunity.161 North Star Steel, a customer located within the 
exclusive service territory of MidAmerican, an electric utility in Iowa, 
sought to purchase competitively priced electricity and requested that 
MidAmerican wheel power to it.162 MidAmerican refused, and North Star 
sued, alleging that the utility violated the antitrust laws by refusing to 
allow access to its transmission lines.163 The court found that active 
supervision of the utility’s conduct existed due to the fact that by statute in 
Iowa new customers were assigned to exclusive service providers and, in 
the event there was a conflict over which provider was in control of a 
given area, the regulator determined which provider should “occupy” the 
area.164 The court found that Iowa’s legislature “affirmatively expressed” a 
policy of displacing competition in the market for retail electric service.165 
The court refused, however, to explore the substantive basis for the 
agency’s regulatory determinations in defining exclusive service 
territories.166 For instance, even though the state had experimented with 
limited “pilot” retail wheeling programs,167 the court did not evaluate 
whether the state agency’s efforts to promote competition in power supply 
might coexist with maintaining exclusive service territories over 
transmission and distribution, effectively deferring to state regulators on 
all of these issues.168 In fact, the only regulatory action that was discussed 
by the court related to the definition of distribution service territories, not 
1988)). 
 160. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220. The case presents a notable contrast to a later Tenth 
Circuit case, in which the court refused to extend state action immunity to unilateral activity which 
was “neither mandated, nor authorized, nor reviewed, nor even known about” by the state regulator. 
Telecor Communications, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1140 (10th Cir. 2002). 
This case is also too narrow in its construction of state action immunity. As is discussed infra, state 
action immunity should not be limited to purely “unilateral” activity, but should also extend to 
bilateral activity in which the regulator plays a passive role. 
 161. N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 162. Id. at 734.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 738–39. 
 165. Id. at 738. Given a previous ruling by the Iowa Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit assumed 
for collateral estoppel purposes that “under Iowa law the exclusive service territory provisions include 
the generation of electricity for retail sales.” Id. at 737–38. 
 166. The court did not, for example, review how service territories were determined. 
 167. N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 168. Id. 
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the allocation of power supply or generation.169 The court also reasoned 
that “less pervasive regulatory regimes have been held to satisfy the active 
supervision prong.”170  
One of these “less pervasive” regulatory regimes is blanket state 
prohibitions—by statute or regulation—on certain types of pro-
competitive conduct.171 For example, according to Florida’s regulators and 
courts, Florida has adopted a statutory prohibition on retail electric 
competition, outside of self-wheeling arrangements (i.e., a supplier 
transmitting power over the utility’s lines for the supplier’s own use).172 
Although Florida does not have a clear legislative statement regarding the 
issue, Florida’s Public Service Commission (PSC) had adopted a 
regulation which prohibits retail wheeling to provide access to competitive 
power supply outside of self-wheeling arrangements.173 A Florida 
Supreme Court case had previously interpreted this regulation to preclude 
cogenerators from selling their power in the retail market.174 Accepting 
both the regulation and the Florida Supreme Court’s characterization of 
the regulation, the Eleventh Circuit applied state-action immunity to 
preclude an antitrust action by a cogeneration facility against a utility 
which refused to wheel power at a competitive rate.175 The court reasoned 
that “the doors to the PSC were open to all with standing to complain,”176 
but nowhere did the court identify how a private cogenerator might raise 
such issues before the Florida PSC.177 Arguably, it could not, other than by 
directly challenging the state agency regulation authorizing the allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct.  
A way of understanding the antitrust claim before the Eleventh Circuit 
is as a collateral attack on the state agency rule based on a substantive 
violation of federal antitrust law. The decision echoes a previous Eleventh 
Circuit case, in which it was found that state-action immunity protects a 
regulated electric utility’s division of service territories in the county in 
which a customer is located from Sherman Act restraint-of-trade claims.178 
Taken together, these Eleventh Circuit opinions seem to suggest that the 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 739. 
 171. Many states limit competition not through active regulation of the industry but by prohibiting 
certain basic market exchanges or sales. 
 172. PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1988). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 176. Id. at 1570. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Praxair, Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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existence of an agency rule authorizing anticompetitive conduct is enough 
to trigger active supervision.179 If this holds, however, private conduct can 
be insulated from antitrust liability not only by the actions of a state 
legislature, but also a unilaterally adopted agency rule, even if this rule 
prohibits pro-competitive conduct with little or no agency oversight.  
This deferential approach to gatekeeping in antitrust enforcement has 
serious implications for the enforcement of the antitrust laws in 
deregulated markets. In California’s deregulated electric power market, 
wholesale power suppliers possessing market power have allegedly 
engaged in tacit collusion to withhold supply and to thus artificially inflate 
their prices.180 Of course, both federal and state regulation continued, even 
in the context of California’s failed regulation plan.181 FERC made its own 
determinations that individual firms lacked market power and had 
approved several market-based tariffs, allowing deregulation in the 
wholesale market.182 As to California’s retail market, state agencies as 
well had approved the sale of power by these suppliers through the state-
sanctioned market exchange.183 To the extent that the behavior of any 
private firms operating in this market raised a plausible Section 1 (or even 
a Section 2) antitrust claim under the Sherman Act, the mere existence of a 
state-sanctioned and -supervised market should not give rise to state-action 
immunity.  
These appellate court decisions, however, send mixed signals at best. 
At worst, these decisions invite private manipulation of state and local 
 179. Id. at 613 (“An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations must be given controlling 
weight unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”). In an earlier 
case, the Eleventh Circuit relied entirely on the clear-articulation requirement to find state-action 
immunity. See Mun. Utils. Bd. of Albertville v. Ala. Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991). This 
seems to completely take state-action immunity outside of the two part Midcal test, turning it into a 
one-step clear-articulation requirement. In S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 
471 U.S. 48, 60 (1985), the Court stated: “The federal antitrust laws do not forbid the States to adopt 
policies that permit, but do not compel, anticompetitive conduct by regulated private parties. As long 
as the State clearly articulates its intent to adopt a permissive policy, the first prong of the Midcal test 
is satisfied.” The Court made it clear that the presence or absence of compulsion is not the “sine qua 
non to state-action immunity.” Id. 
 180. See Darren Bush & Carrie Mayne, In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation is 
to Blame for California’s Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power 
When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use), 83 OR. L. REV. 207 (2004); Robert B. Martin, III, 
Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust Enforcement in the California Electricity Crisis, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (2003).  
 181. California, for instance, retained a complicated system of state regulation. 
 182. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY UPDATE, supra note 40, ch. 7. 
 183. For discussion of this regulatory framework, see Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation 
Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision 
of Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768 (2002) (book review). 
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regulators to create antitrust immunity. Particularly as state and local 
governments engage in lawmaking in partially deregulated markets, the 
risks of private manipulation of lawmaking are high. Given this, courts 
could improve the functioning of deregulated markets, as well as the 
political process, if they could devise a more principled way of exercising 
their gatekeeping function in the state-action immunity context. 
III. REASSESSING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN ANTITRUST FEDERALISM 
Since Hallie, the Supreme Court has abandoned the political-process-
informed municipal-state distinction in assessing state-action immunity 
from antitrust enforcement. In place of this, federal courts assume a highly 
deferential stance in reviewing both state and local regulation as they 
apply state-action immunity to antitrust challenges to allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct. If a state regulates an activity, courts reviewing 
private conduct under complex regulatory schemes are increasingly likely 
to imply a regulatory policy—sometimes even absent a clear articulation 
of regulatory purpose by the state.184 This indicates a strong judicial 
preference for deference—and against judicial intervention—in applying 
state-action immunity as an antitrust defense. 
The active-supervision prong of state-action immunity is also judicially 
implied in many recent cases involving deregulated electric power 
markets, especially in the Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh circuits.185 These 
courts fail to evaluate the degree of scrutiny provided by state or local 
regulators, as well as whether the purpose of this supervision overlaps 
with the pro-competitive goals of the Sherman Act.186 Their approach 
evinces a serious lapse of judicial gatekeeping in the consideration of 
antitrust challenges to private conduct in restructured industries, such as 
electric power and telecommunications. Without a judicial safeguard, 
overbroad judicial endorsement of state-action immunity allows allegedly 
anticompetitive private conduct to escape scrutiny altogether and risks 
undermining the goals of competition law, particularly as national markets 
in these industries develop. 
 184. Courts do so by making a determination that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct was either 
explicitly envisioned by, or foreseeable to, state legislators. See supra text accompanying notes 134–
44 (referencing the foreseeability approach).  
 185. See supra notes 156–83 and accompanying text. 
 186. Id. 
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A. Deference, Incentives, and Spillover Costs in State-Action Immunity 
Merrick Garland, now a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, has been one of the strongest defenders of this 
deferential approach to state-action immunity in considering the relevance 
of state regulation.187 In a leading article on state-action immunity, he 
argues that there is no principled basis for distinguishing between 
municipalities and states for federal antitrust law purposes.188 Put simply, 
his view is that state and local legislation should not be assessed by the 
federal courts for either their efficiency or rent-seeking effects in antitrust 
cases.189  
Several scholars depart from this strong deference approach to state-
action immunity by proposing efficiency criteria for courts to use in 
evaluating state regulation in antitrust federalism. Responding to Hallie, 
John Shepard Wiley proposes that courts directly address the efficiency, 
and in particular public choice, implications of state and local legislation 
in deciding whether to invoke state-action immunity.190 According to 
Wiley, if anticompetitive legislation is inefficient and the result of 
producer-interest lobbying, state-action immunity should not shield 
conduct authorized under the legislation from scrutiny under the Sherman 
Act.191 In similar spirit, Matthew Spitzer argues that federal courts should 
intervene in evaluating antitrust claims notwithstanding state or local 
legislation if the legislation is inefficient or transfers wealth from 
consumers to producers.192 John Cirace argues that courts should employ 
an efficiency test to evaluate the effects of state and local legislation on 
claims under the Sherman Act.193 Others, such as Steven Semeraro, find 
the efficiency and public choice focus of these scholars incomplete, but 
this does not lead him to recommend strong deference; instead, Semeraro 
argues for rigorous review of state and local regulation on public-interest-
oriented grounds.194  
 187. See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political 
Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987).  
 188. Id. at 502–07. 
 189. Id. at 519. 
 190. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713. 
(1986). 
 191. Id. at 788–89. 
 192. Matthew Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of 
Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1988). 
 193. Cirace, supra note 128.  
 194. Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
203, 212–13 (2000) (arguing that, based on a “status choice” approach, courts should inquire “whether 
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In contrast, defenders of judicial deference in antitrust federalism see 
judicial review of state and local laws for efficiency, rent-seeking, or 
public interest goals as tantamount to federal courts returning to 
substantive due process review of state and local regulation, which 
encroaches on decentralized lawmaking in the economic regulation 
context.195 Like advocates of deregulatory takings in public utility law 
attempt to reinvigorate Lochner v. New York196 in determining government 
liability for regulatory transitions,197 strong deference advocates are 
concerned that judicial intervention in the context of state-action immunity 
will necessarily lead courts to a Lochner-type review of regulation.198 
Garland, for example, favors exempting from judicial review under the 
Sherman Act all regulatory actions by state and local governments except 
for delegations to private parties of the power to restrain the market to 
private parties.199  
However, it has been a hundred years since Lochner was decided and 
more than sixty years since it reigned supreme in utility law,200 and no one 
seriously wishes to invoke its ghost.201 Indeed, if judicial review of 
decentralized lawmaking is approached in a principled and cautious 
manner, a deferential stance to antitrust immunity certainly is not 
necessary to limit the scope of judicial review. As Daniel Gifford has 
argued, federal courts have the capacity to review state and local 
legislation without directly addressing their substantive efficiency 
effects.202 Gifford suggests that courts apply the same “free market” 
approach in the state-action-immunity context that they apply under the 
dormant commerce clause by recognizing two markets.203 State-action 
a government actor’s conception of the public interest is being furthered by the anticompetitive 
restraint”). 
 195. See Garland, supra note 187. 
 196. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 197. See J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE 
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1997). For criticism, see Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. 
L. REV. 1535 (1999) (book review); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident 
Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801 (1999) (book review); Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 
68, at 1460–63; Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297 (1998) (book 
review). 
 198. Garland, supra note 187, at 488 (making an explicit comparison to Lochner). 
 199. Id. at 506. 
 200. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (abandoning 
substantive review of utility rates). 
 201. See Chen, supra note 197, at 1568. 
 202. Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why 
We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227 (1995).  
 203. Id. 
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immunity would protect the internal (intra-state) market from trade 
restraints, while the dormant commerce clause extends to the external 
(inter-state) market.204 
Gifford’s “two markets” approach has some appeal, but the bargaining 
process account205 illustrates that judicial review in both constitutional law 
and antitrust federalism contexts could entail something more than judicial 
endorsement of free markets at differing vertical levels. Put simply, a 
private markets theme, focused exclusively on market failure, has too 
much horsepower to serve as a useful test for courts in reviewing state and 
local regulation. Of course, both federal and state-local regulators can 
make choices to regulate in the public interest, or even to take ownership 
of a firm’s resources.206 Thus, neither doctrine really requires private 
competitive markets at either the federal or state level.  
In contrast, a political process bargaining account illustrates how both 
doctrines are primarily concerned with failures in cooperation, rather than 
market competition. So understood, state-action immunity from antitrust 
enforcement serves purposes similar to those the political process account 
of the dormant commerce clause embraces. Apart from Gifford, courts and 
commentators have only explicitly recognized the connection between the 
two doctrines on rare occasions,207 let alone considered whether both 
doctrines share political process concerns.  
Although they do not discuss the similarities between the doctrines, 
Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld have perhaps made the most strident 
political-process-based argument in the antitrust federalism context, 
arguing that state-action immunity should only be invoked where 
regulation imposes substantial spillover costs on out-of-state interests.208 
On their view, state-action immunity would not remove from antitrust 
enforcement all private monopolies, but only those which are actively 
supervised by the state for purposes of limiting the harms that flow from 
unregulated monopoly.209 The active-supervision prong of state-action 
immunity is not inherently anti-commerce, but recognizes the necessity for 
regulation to correct for certain market failures where the public interest 
demands it. On this understanding, for state-action immunity to make 
 204. Id. 
 205. See supra Part I.A.  
 206. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (discussing the ICC and TVA). 
 207. One of those rare occasions is a classic case that created state action immunity. Parker v. 
Brown raised both dormant commerce clause and antitrust challenges to the California raisin 
marketing program. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 208. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 124.  
 209. Id. 
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sense in its application, enforcement of pro-commerce norms is necessary 
where the federalism-based value of participation comes into conflict with 
efficiency, as may occur if state regulation creates spillover costs for those 
who do not participate in the relevant regulatory process. In this respect, 
the process bargaining account of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence 
also might inform the judicial approach to state-action immunity.  
To the extent that this account is correct, courts must set a relatively 
high threshold before invoking gatekeeping presumptions, as they do in 
determining when state-action immunity precludes antitrust enforcement. 
However, recent cases involving utility restructuring illustrate the problem 
of the low state-action-immunity threshold many lower courts currently 
embrace.210 Especially in a process of restructuring or deregulation—
which gives birth to the norms of competition—private firms face strong 
incentives to use the regulatory process to enact partial regulatory schemes 
for purposes of establishing immunity from the antitrust laws. As states 
have begun to deregulate industries such as telecommunications and 
electric power, the nature of state regulation has changed. Rather than 
regulating utilities through rate and traditional certificate-of-need 
proceedings,211 increasingly regulators are laying down general structural 
rules or approving structural, rather than pricing, tariffs.212 Most agree 
that, with the rise of competitive markets, antitrust law plays a more—not 
less—important role than under traditional rate regulation.213 As one 
Department of Justice lawyer has recognized in the context of antitrust 
enforcement in emerging competitive electric power markets, “If a state 
opens its retail market to competition, then the state action doctrine would 
not apply to conduct that relates directly to retail competition.”214 The 
 210. See supra Part II.B. 
 211. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 212. Order 888 is an example. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY UPDATE, supra note 40, ch. 8. 
 213. See Dibadj, supra note 13. See also Ray S. Bolze et al., Antitrust Law Regulation: A New 
Focus for a Competitive Energy Industry, 21 ENERGY L.J. 79 (2000); Jade Alice Eaton, Recent United 
States Department of Justice Actions in the Electric Utility Industry, 9 CONN. J. INT’L L. 857 (1994); 
Craig A. Glazer & M. Bryan Little, The Roles of Antitrust Law and Regulatory Oversight in the 
Restructured Electricity Industry, 12 ELECTRICITY J. 21 (May 1999); William J. Kolasky, Network 
Effects: A Contrarian View, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 577 (1999); John Burrit McArthur, Anti-trust in 
the New [De]Regulated Natural Gas Industry, 18 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1997); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A 
Proposed Antitrust Analysis of Telecommunications Joint Ventures, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 639; William 
Baer, FTC Perspectives on Competition Policy and Enforcement Initiatives in Electric Power, Address 
Before the Conference on the New Rules of the Game for Electric Power: Antitrust and 
Anticompetitive Behavior (Dec. 4, 1997), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/elec1204.htm; Robert 
Pitofsky, Competition Policy in Communications Industries: New Antitrust Approaches, Address 
Before the Glasser LegalWorks Seminar on Competitive Policy in Communications Industries: New 
Antitrust Approaches (Mar. 10, 1997), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/newcomm.htm. 
 214. Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., State Action Doctrine Losing Relevance, Department of Justice 
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reality of separating regulated from unregulated conduct for antitrust 
federalism purposes is hardly simple, however, as states frequently 
endorse competition in some, but not all, aspects of formerly regulated 
industries, such as electric power and telecommunications.215  
A political process bargaining framework is consistent with the overall 
goal of protecting markets, in both the internal and external contexts, but 
advises a different emphasis for state-action immunity than previous 
efforts, such as Gifford’s, which allow consistency with free market 
principles to drive both dormant commerce clause jurisprudence and state-
action immunity.216 Understanding state and local legislation as based in 
bargaining focuses on the process that leads to lawmaking, rather than on 
unregulated markets themselves. Between states, bargaining frequently 
fails, and may be costly to achieve, given the Compact Clause.217 The 
dormant commerce clause serves as a safeguard to this concern.  
Within a state, as in other lawmaking processes, private interest groups 
frequently face incentives to lobby lawmakers to secure benefits, and may 
prefer open-ended regulatory schemes which leave details to be worked 
out by an agency firm-by-firm. The more local the lawmaking process, the 
less costly it is for powerful interest groups to organize and influence the 
process, but lawmaking can have serious spillover effects for non-
participants. At the local level, capture may be more visible, but it also 
may be more stable, given ability to capture the political as well as the 
regulatory process. Thus, if courts are to focus on the quality of the 
political process leading to enactment of a market restraint, the now-
defunct municipal-state distinction is sensible. It would require courts to 
apply more scrutiny to local, as opposed to state, regulations in restraint of 
trade. Instead of protecting markets per se, state-action immunity (like the 
dormant commerce clause) can be understood as representation-
reinforcing. The main difference is that, in the Sherman Act context, 
Congress has already declared an overriding purpose of competition, so 
Attorney Says, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, May 15, 1999, at 70 (quoting Milton A. Marquis, attorney 
with U.S. Department of Justice antitrust division). 
 215. See  DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY UPDATE, supra note 40, ch. 8. 
 216. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. Others draw on this approach, but do not 
fully develop its implications for network and other regulated industries. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra 
note 128 (focusing on interstate market effects of regulation); Levmore, supra note 38, at 626–29 
(arguing state action immunity should be reformulated to focus on the effects of regulation in interstate 
markets). 
 217. See supra note 77. 
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the primary source of the competitive norm is legislative, not based on an 
implicit norm of cooperation between the states.218 
This account also has implications for the judicial approach in applying 
state-action immunity to lawmaking at the state level, as courts frequently 
are asked to do in deregulated electric power and telecommunications 
markets. As Frank Easterbook has suggested, legal presumptions can play 
an important role in antitrust law, particularly where they serve as 
gatekeeping filters for judicial consideration of antitrust claims.219 If state-
action-immunity doctrine is approached as providing default rules to guide 
judicial intervention, such presumptions could set positive incentives in 
the bargaining process of state lawmaking.  
First, as to the clear-articulation requirement, courts could clarify that 
this is a type of a clear-statement rule designed to promote more 
democratic decisionmaking at the state level. State-action immunity, 
implied from the Sherman Act, affords immunity for purposes of 
promoting federalism—valued because of the democratic legitimacy it 
affords, not because state decisions in and of themselves are sacrosanct. 
Clear-statement rules skew decisionmaking toward the political process.220 
If the state legislature adopts a clear statement, or expressly articulates 
policy to regulate in restraint of trade, courts may decline to interfere 
under the first prong of the Midcal test. As William Page has argued in 
some of the leading articles on state-action immunity, such a clear 
statement heightens the visibility of legislation, encouraging participants 
in the political process to acquire information about and to debate 
policies.221 Absent such a statement, private conduct that is consistent with 
or authorized by broad delegations to municipal governments or regulatory 
agencies would be subject to review under the Sherman Act.  
Dillon’s Rule, a canon that only broadly applied in states to invalidate 
broad state delegations to municipalities (most states have moved away 
from this with the growth of “home rule”), may serve the same overall 
goal of providing a higher level of supervision for municipal 
lawmaking.222 The effect of the clear-articulation requirement, however, is 
 218. See supra note 19. 
 219. Easterbrook, supra note 123. 
 220. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement 
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992). 
 221. William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and 
Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099 (1981); 
William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic 
Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618. 
 222. See Gillette, supra note 6. 
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not to create a federally-enforced version of Dillon’s Rule. Dillon’s Rule 
invalidates delegations to municipalities absent express approval by the 
state legislature.223 In contrast to Dillon’s Rule, which automatically 
invalidates the delegation, the clear-articulation requirement would subject 
the delegation to scrutiny under the Sherman Act, but might still allow it 
to stand if it did not unlawfully restrain trade or was not otherwise 
anticompetitive. 
Yet, traditional clear-statement rules have their limits, as they assume 
that a legislature itself speaks with a single purpose and voice. As Kenneth 
Shepsle and many others before and after him have put it, a legislature is a 
“they,” not an “it.”224 A clear-statement rule is a hermeneutic effort to get 
at legislative intent—to pay fidelity to past preferences, which are a 
judicially constructed fiction—but a legislature will rarely have a clear 
intent on an issue of complex economic regulation. Courts can readily 
abuse clear-statement rules to the extent that judges use judicially-implied 
clear statements as a backdoor means to impose a constitutional design—
“judicial modesty cloaking judicial activism.”225 Moreover, a clear 
statement rule assumes that the major problem is the legislature, not the 
interest groups which interact with lawmaking bodies.  
By contrast, a different type of interpretive canon—“preference-
eliciting default rules”—provides a better way of conceptualizing the 
clear-articulation requirement in state-action immunity.226 Einer Elhauge 
has recently argued for a “penalty default rules” in judicial interpretation 
of statutes: Where a court interpreting a statute is unsure of Congress’s 
intent, the court adopts the interpretation of the statute that is most 
unfavorable to the interest group which is most capable of persuading 
Congress to reverse the interpretation.227 Much as penalty default rules in 
contract law are designed to elicit better information in future 
contracting,228 such a penalty-enhancing approach encourages a different 
type of private behavior in future lawmaking processes. Specifically, 
Elhauge envisions a preference-eliciting approach as influencing private 
behavior to procure more explicit legislative action in the future, which 
 223. See Merriam v. Moody’s Executors, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868).  
 224. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
 225. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 220, at 646. 
 226. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162 
(2002). 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice 
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992). 
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will increase the accountability of the political process.229 The clear-
articulation requirement in state-action immunity serves a similar purpose. 
Understood as a penalty-enhancing default rule, a clear-articulation 
requirement does not give rise to automatic state-action immunity where a 
legislature could merely foresee some regulatory activity. Instead, a 
penalty-default clear-statement rule would assign ambiguity a result that 
the interest groups most likely to reverse the interpretation (i.e., those with 
monopoly power in an industry) would disfavor—here, antitrust 
enforcement. Interest groups may be successful in persuading state 
lawmakers to adopt an antitrust exemption for industries, but lawmakers 
should be required to use clear and unmistakable language in supplanting 
antitrust laws with delegations to local governments or regulatory 
agencies.  
A preference-eliciting penalty-default rule is only a partial solution to 
the problem created by regulatory incompleteness in state lawmaking. A 
clear articulation of purpose is necessary, and does a lot of the heavy 
lifting in state-action-immunity analysis, but it is not a sufficient basis for 
suspending judicial review of market conduct under the Sherman Act. 
Some evaluation of how the state engaged in regulatory oversight is also 
necessary to guard against private abuse of a regulatory gap. The active-
supervision prong of Midcal provides this, and as Ticor would suggest, it 
is incumbent on federal courts to take this prong seriously.  
The Ninth Circuit has recognized the importance of active supervision 
in restructured network industries by applying Midcal in a way that 
contrasts markedly with the approaches of the Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh 
circuits. Columbia Steel Casting, Inc. v. Portland General Electric Co.,230 
a leading Ninth Circuit case on the topic, embraces a skeptical stance to a 
state-action-immunity claim in a partially deregulated electric power 
market. There, the state of Oregon had clearly expressed a legislative 
policy to remove market competition by authorizing regulators to approve 
allocations of service territories.231 However, Midcal and Ticor suggest 
that, in considering antitrust claims, judicial gatekeepers examine not only 
the legislature’s clarity in delegating to the regulator, but also what the 
regulator does in exercising its discretion.232 Recognizing this, the Ninth 
Circuit properly refused to extend state-action immunity to a utility’s 
purported anticompetitive conduct in dividing Portland into exclusive 
 229. Elhauge, supra note 226. 
 230. 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 231. Id. at 1433 n.2. 
 232. See supra notes 127, 150–55 and accompanying text. 
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service territories, given that regulators had not made firm-specific 
decisions to displace competition with regulation.233 Although the utility 
claimed that its conduct was consistent with previous contracts and orders 
agreed to under generally delegated ratemaking authority, the only way the 
regulator could have mandated service territories was pursuant to a statute 
under which the regulator had not acted.234 “[M]ere ‘state authorization, 
approval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive private conduct 
confers no antitrust immunity,’”235 the Ninth Circuit explained.  
If a clear articulation of purpose alone were sufficient to provide a 
shield from the Sherman Act, this would create perverse incentives for 
interest groups in the state and local lawmaking process. It would allow 
select, powerful private interests to lobby lawmakers for a delegation 
under clear statutory language (however broad) and then engage in 
conduct that completely escapes the scrutiny of both agency regulators and 
courts—even where the conduct would otherwise be anticompetitive under 
the Sherman Act. If courts reduce state-action immunity to foreseeability 
under Hallie, based on implied legislative intent,236 state-action immunity 
has the same potential result. By encouraging firms to lobby for antitrust 
exclusion in state legislation, state-action immunity can have harmful 
forum selection effects. For example, a state restructuring plan that 
envisions a scheme of competitive restructuring as displacing antitrust 
enforcement could eviscerate the competitive norms of the antitrust laws, 
regardless of how such a scheme actually organizes the industry and 
monitors firm behavior. Antitrust federalism allows positive regulation by 
decentralized governmental bodies, but it does not authorize raw state 
repeal of federal antitrust law through ambiguous delegations or even 
through plain language overrides of the Sherman Act.237 Thus, to the 
extent the preference-eliciting default-rule interpretation of state-action 
immunity eviscerates the active scrutiny requirement, it concedes too 
much. This result is not required by judicial deference or antitrust 
federalism, and may prove harmful to social welfare. 
 233. Id. at 1441–42.  
 234. See id. at 1442.  
 235. Id. at 1440 (quoting Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 736 (9th Cir. 
1981)). 
 236. See supra notes 134–43 and accompanying text. 
 237. William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of Antitrust: FTC v. 
Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 189 (1993). 
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B. The Need for an Active-Supervision Inquiry 
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Ticor, and the Ninth Circuit 
embraced in Columbia Steel Casting, active supervision of state 
regulators’ conduct, as well as a clear statement of purpose, is required in 
order to trigger state-action immunity from antitrust enforcement.238 
However, many appellate courts remain astonishingly deferential to 
regulators in applying the active-supervision prong of the Midcal test.239 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in the context of 
municipal regulation, these appellate courts effectively read out of state-
action-immunity analysis any serious scrutiny of regulatory supervision, 
focusing instead on whether a decentralized legislative body has delegated 
authority to supervise private conduct to an agency. In most cases, 
potential supervision of conduct alone has been sufficient to trigger state-
action immunity from enforcement of the antitrust laws.240 
However, judicial deference to regulatory power, or the potential for 
regulation, without more invites interest group manipulation of the 
regulatory forum for enforcement of competition law. For example, in the 
context of electric power restructuring debates at the state level, firms 
seeking immunity from the antitrust laws might lobby for delegation of 
decisions regarding competitive access to essential facilities, as well as 
pricing, to the regulator. It does not follow from a legislative delegation, 
however, that the regulator has in fact exercised authority in ways that are 
consistent with the pro-competitive goals of the Sherman Act. Allowing 
state-action immunity to preclude antitrust enforcement in such 
circumstances creates strong incentives for delegation to state regulators 
with little or no guarantee that such authority is exercised in ways that 
promote federalism or social welfare, let alone competition. 
If anticompetitive conduct warrants any scrutiny under antitrust 
federalism, appellate courts must depart from their current and past 
practice of ignoring, or diluting, the active-supervision requirement. A 
preference-eliciting default-rule approach is also useful in addressing this 
aspect of Midcal.241 Rather than implying active supervision from the 
historical fact of delegation, as most courts do, a general presumption 
against active supervision would force litigants to present evidence of a 
 238. See supra notes 150–55, 230–31 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra Part II.B (discussing Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits). 
 240. For example, potential regulation by a utility commission was found by the Tenth Circuit to 
be sufficient in Trigen, discussed supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Elhauge, supra note 226.  
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pattern or regulatory activity and would elicit more explicit future 
lobbying of regulators by monopolies. Put simply, an opportunity for 
regulation is not the same as active supervision—although courts seem to 
consistently reach this conclusion.242 The opportunity for regulation is a 
first step of the active-supervision analysis, but it hardly concludes it.243 A 
preference-eliciting default-rule approach also requires courts to assess 
how frequently, and under what circumstances, supervisory authority is 
exercised by regulators.  
For example, the Second Circuit recently refused to extend state-action 
immunity to an output cartel permitted by New York legislation 
implementing a tobacco settlement.244 The legislation was clear and 
express in its purpose to implement market share allocations in the sale of 
cigarettes, but the Second Circuit criticized the state for failing to 
articulate either a competitive or anticompetitive rationale for the 
policy.245 Regardless of whether the clear-articulation requirement had 
been met, and whether the cartel was foreseeable under Hallie, the Second 
Circuit refused to extend state-action immunity due to a lack of active 
supervision, as is required by the second prong of Midcal.246 As the court 
observed, neither the New York statutes, the settlement, nor any other 
regulation envisioned active supervision of pricing under the cartel.247 
Given “no mechanism” for reviewing the reasonableness of pricing 
decisions or monitoring market conditions,248 the court concluded “New 
York has failed to provide for any state supervision, much less active 
supervision, of the pricing conduct of cigarette manufacturers under the 
anticompetitive market structure.”249 It further observed, “Absent such a 
program of supervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private party’s 
 242. See supra Part II. 
 243. Raising a similar concern, the FTC Report of the State Action Task Force states, “One 
recurring problem involves the failure to distinguish between authorizing classes of activity and 
forming state policy to displace competition.” FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 26. 
 244. Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).  
 245. Id. at 229–30. The court was not convinced by the health benefit claims made by the state in 
the course of litigation, and observed that the only public discussion of the effect of the market-share 
provisions was to increase prices and to discourage young people from smoking—the precise type of 
cartel that the Sherman Act condemns. Id. at 230. In an order on rehearing, the court clarified: “the 
court must find under this [clear-articulation] prong that the state did not inadvertently include 
anticompetitive activities in some larger scheme. For this reason, it is important that a state enunciate 
its intent to displace competition when it means to do so.” Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 363 F.3d 
149, 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (order on rehearing). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Freedom Holdings, Inc., 357 F.3d at 231. 
 249. Id. at 232. 
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anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the 
party’s individual interests.”250 
Recognizing the important role an active-supervision inquiry plays in 
antitrust federalism, the Ninth Circuit has also refused to find state-action 
immunity on this ground in the context of deregulated electric power 
markets. The court allowed Snake River Valley Electric Association, an 
electrical cooperative, to sue an investor-owned utility for anticompetitive 
denial of access to essential transmission facilities, rejecting the utility’s 
claim to state-action immunity.251 The utility argued that the state 
regulatory scheme clearly envisioned the utility refusing to wheel—to the 
extent the state had adopted a clear policy to displace competition among 
electric suppliers—but the Ninth Circuit did not allow this to trigger 
antitrust immunity.252 Under Idaho state law, the utility could decline the 
customer’s wheeling request without the substantive review of a state 
agency or state courts, but the court reasoned that “[t]his is the type of 
private regulatory power that the active-supervision prong of Midcal is 
supposed to prevent.”253 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, while a self-
policing regulatory scheme may qualify for state-action immunity without 
active supervision,254 where the regulator has discretion to exercise active 
supervision it is an appropriate object of inquiry for a court. Similarly, 
perhaps signaling a departure from the deferential approach it previously 
had embraced in the electric power context,255 the Tenth Circuit refused to 
extend state-action immunity to lock up telephone contracts procured by 
Southwestern Bell that were “neither mandated, nor authorized, nor 
reviewed, nor even known about by” state regulators.256  
Cognizant of the potential gap that a low active-supervision threshold 
can create, some lower courts recognize that active supervision “would be 
satisfied if the state or state agencies held ratemaking hearings on a 
consistent basis.”257 This is a good starting point for judicial analysis of the 
application of antitrust laws in a restructured network environment. Courts 
have a long history of allowing the existence of consistent ratemaking 
 250. Id. (quoting Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988)). 
 251. Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. PacifiCorp, 238 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 1194. 
 254. Id. (citing Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344 n.6 (1987) and FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. 
Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640 (1992)). 
 255. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text. 
 256. Telecor Communications, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1140 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 257. See Green v. People Energy Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,999 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 
(finding active supervision where lengthy hearings were held on gas supplier’s rates on a consistent 
basis). 
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hearings at the state or local level to give rise to state-action immunity. In 
Ticor, for instance, the Supreme Court found it relevant that the Wisconsin 
state regulatory body had not held rate hearings prior to approving a 
jointly filed insurance rate.258 Thus, extending a presumption of state-
action immunity, and against judicial intervention, in the context of rate 
hearings is appropriate. 
Mere private contracts, however, do not meet this standard. For 
example, an agency-approved contract provision prohibiting a customer 
from entering into the electricity market as a competitor in the future, 
offered by a utility in exchange for a discounted rate, is not protected by 
state-action immunity.259 For similar reasons, mere private filings of 
contracts or tariffs with a regulatory agency, without active regulatory 
scrutiny or oversight, would not meet the active-supervision requirement. 
Without meaningful agency review of the specific private conduct at issue, 
state-action immunity can be abused by private firms in a deregulatory 
environment.260 The factors that should guide courts in identifying active 
supervision include how frequently agencies monitor private activities, 
whether agencies have authority to enforce standards through the 
imposition of penalties, and whether agencies have adequate resources to 
engage in meaningful monitoring and enforcement. When in doubt, if a 
regulatory system risks the imposition of spillover effects on non-
participants, the presumption should be against invoking state-action 
immunity. 
In interpreting the active-supervision requirement, courts must be true 
to the overall federalism purposes of state-action immunity. Fidelity to 
federalism would not limit assessment of supervision to state regulation 
only, but would also include other regulatory bodies, such as 
municipalities. In addition, fidelity to federalism would require some 
attention to the process which gives rise to regulatory supervision. If the 
purposes of regulatory action overlap with the overall consumer welfare 
goals of the Sherman Act, perhaps some degree of deference to 
supervision by the state or local regulator is appropriate. However, if the 
purpose is blatantly protectionist, in ways that do not even arguably 
 258. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 630 (1992). 
 259. United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172, 176 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 260. As the FTC Report of the State Action Task Force observes: 
Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct, pursuant to that 
[clearly-articulated] regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports with that stated criterion. 
Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be deemed that of the state itself, and 
political responsibility for the conduct fairly be placed with the state.  
FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 54. 
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improve consumer welfare and that impose spillover costs on those in 
other jurisdictions who have not participated in the process leading to the 
adoption of regulation, intervention of the antitrust laws is entirely 
appropriate. A preference-eliciting default rule would align private 
incentives to ensure more explicit procurement of state-action immunity 
via legislation and regulatory activity. 
In contrast to the Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit 
correctly makes an affirmative finding of active supervision by the 
regulator a predicate to any finding of state-action immunity, even in 
deregulated markets. However, a more recent Ninth Circuit case 
addressing state-action immunity in the very same antitrust claim 
illustrates how readily the active-supervision prong will be undermined if 
courts allow it to hinge entirely on the nature of the regulatory program 
approved by a state legislature rather than on what regulators do in 
implementing that program.261 On the heels of the court’s recognition that 
there was no state-action immunity in the first Snake River Valley Electric 
Association case,262 the Ninth Circuit extended state-action immunity to 
the same allegedly anticompetitive conduct.263 Following the first judicial 
finding of no state-action immunity, which allowed antitrust litigation to 
go forward, the Idaho legislature intervened by amending its Electric 
Supplier Stabilization Act, under which the utility had previously declined 
a wheeling request absent agency review.264 The amendments allowed an 
electric supplier to refuse to wheel power if the requested wheeling 
“results in retail wheeling and/or a sham wholesale transaction,” subject to 
review of the state regulatory agency.265 In addition, the Idaho legislature 
prohibited competing suppliers from serving customers or former 
customers of other electric suppliers unless the competing supplier 
petitions the Idaho regulator and the regulator issues an order allowing the 
service.266  
In reviewing this legislative intervention, the Ninth Circuit held that, 
unlike the previous statutory arrangement, which left the decision not to 
wheel entirely to private choice, the amended statute “has not left 
unregulated a private preserve without competition” and thus meets the 
 261. See infra notes 263–68 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 251–54 and accompanying text. 
 263. Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. PacifiCorp (Snake River Valley II), 357 F.3d 1042, 1048–
51 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 264. Id. at 1048. 
 265. IDAHO CODE § 61-322D(1) (2002). 
 266. IDAHO CODE § 61-334B (2002). 
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active-supervision requirement for state-action immunity.267 The Ninth 
Circuit emphasized that the Idaho statute precluded a private utility from 
wheeling without a contrary decision by the state regulator.268 The result 
of this ruling is that statutes and regulations that prohibit competitive 
conduct can eviscerate any active-supervision requirement.269 On this 
approach, if a private firm is successful in lobbying for a statute that 
prohibits it from engaging in competitive conduct, it would be immune 
from antitrust challenge, even if that legislation occurs in the context of a 
pending antitrust challenge. However, as the analysis of this Article 
suggests, a court should not take a law prohibiting access to a network 
facility at face value, but should carefully evaluate the scope of the 
regulator’s discretion to override any private choice to engage in 
anticompetitive behavior, including the criteria the regulator is to apply in 
making such a decision.  
Revival of the active-supervision portion of judicial review as a type of 
preference-eliciting default rule in state-action-immunity analysis does not 
imply that courts should subject state and local regulation to strict scrutiny 
review, as advocates of deference seem to imply. Rather, to make the 
connection explicit, the type of judicial review called for in evaluating 
state-action immunity is more akin to what courts provide under the 
political process account of the dormant commerce clause. A focus on 
agency monitoring and enforcement, along with the prospect of negative 
spillover effects on non-participants, makes it more likely that these will 
be taken into account in the state or local political process. Perhaps 
mindful of the connection between these two legal doctrines—but without 
drawing any explicit connection between them—the FTC’s Report of the 
State Action Task Force recommends “judicial recognition of the problems 
associated with overwhelming interstate spillovers, and consider such 
spillovers as a factor in case and amicus/advocacy selection.”270  
In terms of remedy, a failure to apply state-action immunity has less 
significant consequences than other judicial review of legislation or 
regulation. It does not result in condemning public conduct or necessarily 
striking legislation but instead merely subjects private conduct to review 
under the antitrust laws. If the type of regulation does not present veiled 
wealth transfers—benign rent-seeking would not impair the political 
 267. Snake River Valley II, 357 F.3d at 1049. 
 268. Id. at 1050. 
 269. This was allowed by the Eleventh Circuit in TEC Cogeneration. See supra notes 175–77 and 
accompanying text. 
 270. FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 56. 
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process—private conduct that is supervised by the regulator generally 
would be shielded from the scope of the Sherman Act. Rent-seeking that 
thwarts the representative political process, however, would not be used 
by private firms as a strategy to escape judicial review under the antitrust 
standards of the Sherman Act. Such an approach preserves federalism 
values by protecting the type of democratic participation that forms the 
core of federalism. It also reduces the incentive for private interest groups 
to quietly lobby state and local regulators in ways that allow state-action 
immunity to become a private strategy for opting out of antitrust 
enforcement in ways that impose spillover costs for those within a state or 
local government who are not part of the lawmaking process. 
CONCLUSION 
More than two decades ago, a classic exchange between (now Judge) 
Merrick Garland and Cass Sunstein debated the merits of courts engaging 
in “hard look” review of agency decisions to deregulate industries.271 
Judicial deference has an undeniably important place in public law 
generally, including in the law of economic regulation. Under the Chevron 
doctrine, which federal courts frequently invoke to defer to reasonable 
agency interpretations of law,272 a federal agency’s construction of its 
jurisdictional statutes is generally upheld. Because deference to a federal 
agency leads to national uniformity, judicial deference in reviewing 
regulations involving federalism issues implicitly adopts a national 
supremacy understanding of federalism. Courts have a general preference 
for a federal supremacy approach to the resolution of jurisdictional battles 
and for uniformity in their legal resolution.273 Most discussions of 
deference in regulatory law focus on horizontal allocations of power, 
between courts and regulatory agencies at the same hierarchical level. 
Certainly, however, vertical deference issues implicate a different set of 
concerns, as constitutional law and antitrust federalism illustrate, and may 
be at odds with the uniformity values promoted by horizontal deference.  
 271. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985) 
(criticizing “hard look” review of agency decisionmaking); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the 
Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177. 
 272. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As the 
Supreme Court stated in Chevron, “an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking 
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.” Id. at 865. 
 273. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987). 
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Public law has not adequately addressed the different kinds of judicial 
deference at work in implementing competition policy. Restructuring of 
network industries not only concerns the explicit choices of agency 
regulators, but also the implicit opportunities the political and regulatory 
processes provide for strategic private choices to manipulate public 
regulation. Elsewhere, I have argued that judicial deference to private firm 
rate filings, even involving federal agencies, does not enhance the goals of 
competition and regulatory law absent judicial safeguards to protect 
against strategic private tariffing.274 Due to the regulatory-enforcement 
void presented by gaps and concurrent jurisdiction, the “filed rate 
doctrine” (a defense to private claims against utilities) did encourage 
private firms to add terms to the regulatory contract that suit their private 
interests, leading to particularly worrisome forum selection behavior 
where regulators do not actively evaluate the content of tariffs. Strategic 
forum shopping in tariff filing threatens to undermine competitive electric 
power and telecommunications markets.275 For this reason, it may be 
necessary for courts to evaluate the public interest in selection of an 
enforcement forum in applying the filed tariff doctrine, rather than leave 
this decision entirely within the realm of private choice.276  
As this Article’s analysis of the dormant commerce clause and state-
action immunity suggests, though, the bargaining problems presented by 
gaps and concurrent jurisdiction are much broader than the issue presented 
by tariffs and other private filings with regulatory agencies. Blanket 
deference to state and local politics also fails to promote the goals of 
regulatory law or competition policy. The temptation for judicial 
avoidance, and judicial deference, is strong where complex technical 
issues are under review, as in the context of electric power and 
telecommunications regulation.277 A strong judicial deference stance 
converges with the overall trend towards decentralization, popular among 
many free market advocates,278 and punting an issue back to the state and 
 274. Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 
56 VAND. L. REV. 1591 (2003) (arguing that courts should not embrace a broad presumption in favor 
of the filed tariff doctrine). 
 275. Id.  
 276. Id. at 1658–59. See also Jim Rossi, Debilitating Doctrine, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 
2004, at 16 (discussing problems with the filed-rate doctrine in the context of Texas’s deregulated 
electric power market). 
 277. See Garland, supra note 187; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial 
Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991). 
 278. Although, as is noted supra note 5, many leading scholars are skeptical of the ability of 
decentralized regulatory processes to adequately sustain competitive interstate markets. While I do not 
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local political process appeals to advocates of the new federalism. 
However, as this Article argues, federal court deference to state and local 
political processes results in seriously harmful effects for competitive 
markets.  
A bargaining-centered approach to economic regulation recognizes an 
important role for state and local regulation, even in deregulated markets. 
At the same time, due to the possibility of strategic private manipulation of 
vertical (federal-state) bargaining space, blanket judicial deference to state 
and local regulation in the contexts of the dormant commerce clause and in 
the judicial gatekeeping function of applying state-action immunity to 
antitrust claims ignores private incentives in decentralized lawmaking. 
Further, as a focus on bargaining suggests, these two independent judicial 
doctrines hold promise to improve the lawmaking process at the state and 
local level if they are approached with similar goals in mind, rather than as 
in tension. At their core, both doctrines share the goal of promoting 
bargaining in the lawmaking process while minimizing private incentives 
in state and local lawmaking that lead to overall reductions in social 
welfare in the form of the imposition of spillover costs on those who do 
not participate in the relevant lawmaking process.  
In a leading article on the transformation of the law of regulated 
industries, Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill predict that the courts will 
play a fundamental role as economic regulation and competition policies 
are reformulated.279 We need not relive the mistakes of the failed Lochner 
era, but parallels in the dormant commerce clause and state-action 
immunity lay seed for a common principle for courts to look to in 
reviewing state and local regulations. Whether courts are invalidating 
legislation, as in the context of the dormant commerce clause, or serving 
as a gatekeeper for antitrust scrutiny, as in the context of state-action 
immunity, the purpose in reviewing state or local political processes is the 
same—to improve democratic lawmaking among and within the states. 
Without such improvement, it is foolhardy to think that competitive 
markets will thrive as formerly regulated markets are restructured at the 
state and local, as well as the federal, levels of government. 
disagree, I also am not optimistic that Congress can solve all of these problems on its own through 
some sort of national legislation that preempts all state and local regulation. Given the likely failure of 
Congress to act in a comprehensive and preemptive manner, public law has an important role to play 
in improving decentralized lawmaking for competitive markets.  
 279. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1369 (“Although lacking the same policymaking 
authority as Congress and regulatory commissions, the courts affect the pace, extent, or manner of 
regulatory change each time they decide a case involving legislative or administrative regulatory 
policies—whether they ratify, overturn, or require the government to reconsider a particular policy.”).  
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